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SOUND AND SILENCE:  
A PSYCHOANALYTIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE MEDIUM 
  
Margaret McCurry 
 
“A Mute is one that acteth speakingly…” – Brome,  
The Antipodes v. 41 
 
 
 
The art of theatre relies heavily upon both visual and 
auditory cues to inspire emotions in the audience. So vital is 
the role of auditory perception to audiences that the origins of 
the word “audience” can be traced back to the fourteenth cen-
tury Old French word, audience (“the act or state of hearing, 
action or condition of listening”), which developed from the 
Latin audentia (“a hearing, listening”) (Harper).2 Opera, in 
particular, relies even more heavily upon sound for audience 
members to understand the texts, meanings, and emotions. 
When the curtain rises, audiences anticipate that they will hear 
something. What significance, then, does an opera with a mute 
character hold—a character who auditorily conveys nothing?  
In this paper, I wish to explore the dialectic of sound 
and silence in Gian Carlo Menotti’s opera, The Medium, by 
introducing several interrelated psychoanalytic theories and 
proposing possibilities as to the significance of these binary 
phenomena. The opera features two auditory anomalies: a 
mute character and sourceless, haunting echoes. After provid-
ing summaries of Act I and Act II, I will analyze the historical 
                                                
1 “Speakingly.”The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, vol. 7. 
(New York: The Century Co., 1904), 3804. 
2 Harper, Douglas, “Audience,” Def. 1, Online Etymology Diction-
ary.  
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relationship between muteness and melodrama. Next, I will 
explore “Monica’s Waltz,” the opening scene of Act II, in 
which Monica, Baba’s daughter, sings to Toby, a mute gypsy 
boy, and then “sings” his responses for him. This scene exem-
plifies the semiotic elements of Toby’s communication and 
captures the quintessence of the melodramatic features of the 
opera as a whole. After this, I will provide a summary of Julia 
Kristeva’s theory of semiotic language and I will use the phi-
losophy of Cathy Caruth to study the echoes that haunt Baba, 
each voice representing a Caruthian “voice that cries out,”3 for 
which I argue is Toby’s traumatic “voice.” Finally, I will con-
clude the paper by placing these ideas in conversation with 
Sigmund Freud’s research regarding the uncanny.  
 
Act I: “A Cold, Cold Hand” 
 
The entirety of the two-act opera takes place in the 
parlor of Baba, a woman who conducts routine séances under 
the alias of Madame Flora. Act I opens as Monica plays make-
believe with Toby, dressing him in silks of brilliant colors. 
Baba arrives, inebriated, and reprimands Toby for touching 
her things. Soon thereafter, three guests arrive and a séance 
begins. Two of the guests, Mr. and Mrs. Gobineau communi-
cate with an entity they believe to be their son. Because he 
died at the age of two, he is unable to speak to them and only 
laughs. Mrs. Nolan, the third guest, experiences a séance for 
the first time. She seeks to connect with her teenage daughter, 
who comforts Mrs. Nolan (“Mummy, Mummy dear, you must 
not cry for me”).4 What the guests do not realize, however, is 
that Monica is responsible for the responses of the dead—she 
imitates the laughter of the Gobineau child and she sings re-
plies to Mrs. Nolan into a microphone behind a curtain. As the 
séance draws to a close, Baba feels a hand around her throat 
                                                
3 Caruth, Cathy, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and 
History. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2016), 3 
4 Menotti, Gian Carlo. The Medium, (G. Schirmer, Inc., 1986), 29. 
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(“[A]ll of a sudden in the dark I felt on my throat a hand — A 
cold, cold hand. It wasn’t the hand of a man. Monica, I’m 
afraid!”5 She accuses Toby of trying to kill her (“Where is 
Toby? He! He’s the one! I know now! He did it!”)6 Act I ends 
with Monica comforting Baba, who frantically counts on her 
rosary and begs for God’s forgiveness. Suddenly, they hear a 
voice coming from offstage—Monica’s voice—singing the 
“Mother, mother, are you there?” leitmotif that Monica sang 
to Mrs. Nolan. This frightens Monica and Baba even more, 
since it is obvious that this time, it is not Monica who is sing-
ing the refrain. 
 
Act II: The Emergence of Toby’s Voice 
 
Act II begins with “Monica’s Waltz” as Toby puts on 
a puppet show for Monica.  Enraptured by her fantasies, Mon-
ica sings and dances to her waltz, and begins to include Toby 
in the realm of her imagination. She sings of her love for Toby 
in the form of a duet, singing not only her part, but Toby’s 
responses to her as well. Baba, drunk, arrives with a slam of 
the door. She confronts Toby and tries to force him to admit 
that he was the one who touched her throat. She bribes him 
with costumes and even with Monica’s hand in marriage, but 
ultimately resorts to physical abuse. The doorbell rings and the 
patrons return. Still frightened from the hand she felt around 
her throat, Baba confesses to her patrons that she has been con-
ning them and attempts to pay them back. The patrons beg her 
to continue the séances, since the connections with their chil-
dren are all they have to hold on to (“Please let us have our 
séance, Madame Flora! Just let us hear it once more, Madame 
Flora! This is the only joy we have in our lives, Madame 
Flora!”7 They leave reluctantly. Baba again accuses Toby and 
                                                
5 Ibid., 44-45. 
6 Ibid., 46-47. 
7 Ibid., 95-96. 
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forces him to leave the house. He returns during the night and 
is drawn towards the trunk where Baba keeps her costumes. 
When he accidentally slams the lid of the trunk shut, Baba 
wakes up from her drunken sleep. She grabs a gun to protect 
herself against what she believes to be the spirit that has been 
haunting her. Baba sees movement within the puppet theater 
and shoots into it, killing Toby. The curtain falls as Baba bends 
over Toby’s lifeless body and whispers, “Was it you? Was it 
you?”8  
 
The Melodrama of Muteness 
 
While The Medium is unique in that it features a mute 
character in a performance that is fully sung, muteness is a 
theme that spans broadly across the melodramatic genre. In 
“The Mute's Voice: The Dramatic Transformations of the 
Mute and Deaf-Mute in Early-Nineteenth-Century France,” 
Patrick McDonagh examines the history behind the relation-
ship between muteness and the melodrama. Although his re-
search primarily focuses on the way in which historical ac-
counts of muteness have been portrayed on the stage, his work 
can be applied to fictional accounts as well. McDonagh con-
textualizes the metaphorical relationship between the melo-
drama and its corresponding physical manifestations, explain-
ing that the tragedy highlights blindness, with an emphasis on 
foresight, insight, and enlightenment; the comedy highlights 
deafness, with an emphasis on miscommunication and misun-
derstanding; and the melodrama highlights muteness, with an 
emphasis on verbal and emotional expression.9  Most signifi-
cantly, the melodrama lends itself to what he calls “aesthetics 
of muteness,” meaning that mute characters must demonstrate 
                                                
8 Ibid., 121. 
9 McDonagh, Patrick, “The Mute's Voice: The Dramatic Transfor-
mations of the Mute and Deaf-Mute in Early-Nineteenth-Century 
France,” Criticism 55, no. 4 (2013): 657. 
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what they mean physically while also metaphorically pointing 
toward meaning.10   
What makes The Medium a melodrama? Besides “the 
intentional staging of danger and the subsequent heightened 
emotions,”11 the mystery of the mute plays a part. The interre-
lated correspondences between the mute character, who tradi-
tionally holds the truths central to the play’s ideas and enig-
mas, with the marginalization of the mute creates a 
melodramatic atmosphere surrounding the recognition of the 
mute and the secrets he or she has to reveal. Toby’s presence 
raises questions of suspense that the audience struggles to an-
swer throughout the opera: How did Toby become mute? 
What secrets does he withhold? Will he ever learn to speak? 
These questions incite anxieties and feelings of suspense in the 
audience. Stephanie Jensen-Moulton, associate professor of 
Musicology at Brooklyn College, explains: “The idea of mute-
ness in fiction is exemplified . . .  structurally by the predomi-
nance of gaps and textual ellipses, and thematically by an 
overriding concern with language, silence, speech, muteness, 
writing, and blankness.”12 It is these very linguistic features 
that I wish to explore using Julia Kristeva’s theory of semiotic 
language.   
 
Semiotic Language as an Alternative to Speech 
 
As this paper relies so heavily upon Kristeva’s notion 
of semiotic language, it will be helpful to review this concept 
in detail before applying it to The Medium. In Revolutions in 
Poetic Language, Kristeva argues that all signification is ar-
ticulated by the dialectic of two linguistic modes, the symbolic 
and the semiotic. She explains that the semiotic is the means 
                                                
10 Ibid., 657. 
11 Ibid., 669. 
12 Jensen-Moulton, Stephanie, “’What is it you want to tell me?’: 
Muteness and Masculinity in Menotti’s The Medium.” PhD diss., 
CUNY, 24. 
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by which humans express physical drives through prosodic 
linguistic features, including vocal modulations and even 
sphincteral activity.13 The semiotic is expressed with the fluc-
tuations and modulations within music, poetry, or rhythmic 
speech. As a companion to the semiotic, the symbolic is the 
means by which humans express their thoughts using concrete 
syntaxes that are defined by pre-existing, culturally con-
structed standards.14 Symbolic communication is expressed 
with sentences that abide by prescriptive grammatical rules. It 
is important to understand that the semiotic and the symbolic 
are inseparable features of language. If the semiotic acted in 
isolation, it would only contribute senseless babble; if the sym-
bolic acted in isolation, it would only contribute unmotivated 
speech. Without the dialectical oscillation between the semi-
otic and the symbolic, signification would not be possible.15 
Furthermore, these two linguistic modes are inseparable be-
cause they both exist within the conceptual systems of every 
speaker. Kristeva explains, “Because the subject is always 
both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he produces 
can be either “exclusively” semiotic or “exclusively” sym-
bolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness to 
both.”16 All speaking subjects, and therefore, all linguistic ut-
terances, are composed of semiotic features as well as sym-
bolic features; the question is, to what extent?  
Considering that Toby’s muteness bars him from 
complete access to the realm of the symbolic, how does his 
linguistic approach fit within Kristeva’s theory of language? 
Toby’s muteness emphasizes his otherness through a twofold 
process: His physical disability inhibits him from fully partic-
ipating in the production of language, and as a consequence, 
                                                
13 Kristeva, Julie, Revolutions in Poetic Language, (New York: Co-
lumbia, UP, 1984), 38. 
14 Oliver, Kelly, The Portable Kristeva, (New York: Columbia UP, 
1997), xiv. 
15 Ibid., xv. 
16 Kristeva, Revolutions, 34. 
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he is forced to seek alternative means of communication in the 
realm of the semiotic. The dialectic of sound and the absence 
of sound culminates in Toby’s semiotic expressions. Through-
out the opera, we see him nod,17 point,18 knock,19 and mean-
ingfully touch other characters.20 He also expresses himself 
abstractly with the costumes that he wears, with the puppets 
that he manipulates, and most interestingly, through the voices 
of the other characters. Toby enjoys dressing himself in Baba’s 
costumes—Act I opens as Toby dresses himself and Monica 
chides him, reminding him that “you know [Baba will] beat 
you if you touch her things,”21 indicating that this is a circum-
stance that has taken place in the past. Predictably, Baba’s first 
lines, sung when she catches Toby handling the costumes, are 
“How many times I’ve told you not to touch my things! Look 
at you! Dressed with silk and bangles like a woman! Fancying 
yourself a King or something? Stop dreaming, you feeble-
minded gipsy! I told you not to touch my things!”22 Later in 
the opera, Baba offers these very “things” in exchange for a 
confession, singing, “You like that bolt of red silk, don’t you? 
Would you like to have it? Also the necklace of beads? All you 
have to make is one little sign, and they will be yours.”23 Ad-
ditionally, Toby expresses himself semiotically with the pup-
pets he operates. Because Toby cannot control his surround-
ings, he finds pleasure in manipulating the puppets as a means 
of acting out his desires. In fact, the puppet theater is where he 
retreats when Baba threatens to shoot him at the end of the 
opera. He runs there for protection and control, but it cannot 
offer him the safety he desires. Like him, the puppets are 
                                                
17 Menotti, The Medium, 58. 
18 Ibid., 71. 
19 Ibid., 116. 
20 Ibid., 66. 
21 Ibid., 4. 
22 Ibid., 8. 
23 Ibid., 77-78. 
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voiceless, and like him as well, they are manipulated by forces 
outside of their control.  
Paradoxically, the most important linguistic contribu-
tions that Toby makes are his silences. As Jensen-Moulton ex-
plains, “[S]ince he does not sign or communicate beyond nod-
ding, miming, and his own expressive face, Toby’s language 
consists entirely of actions and reactions, and essentially, of 
silences.”24 Indeed, the notion of a mute character in an opera 
is almost oxymoronic. When it is Toby’s turn to participate in 
the sung conversations among characters, something interest-
ing happens— the music “speaks” for him through “rests, gaps 
of vertical dissonance, and one-sided recitatives over sus-
tained single pitches.”25 I wish to explore the way that Toby’s 
linguistic expressions are shaped by Menotti’s music—either 
through the orchestral accompaniment or through the vocal 
lines of the other characters. An analysis of the musical fea-
tures within “Monica’s Waltz” reveals that the scene is en-
tirely contingent upon the semiotic melodrama of Toby’s dis-
ability. 
  
Monica’s Waltz: “What is it you want to tell me?”  
 
 Swept away by her fantasies, Monica begins her 
Waltz by describing the instruments, the dress of the dancers, 
and the supernatural elements of the dance. She takes Toby’s 
hands, pulling him into her circle and inviting him to dance 
with her. The Waltz comes to a sudden stop when Toby grabs 
Monica’s arm. The stage directions over measure 27 indicate, 
“Toby seizes Monica abruptly by the arm. She turns and looks 
                                                
24 Jensen-Moulton, “Muteness and Masculinity,” 19. 
25 Ibid., 24. 
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at him in complete astonishment,”26 precisely when the or-
chestra plays a C-D dyad over an A-flat octave. Monica asks, 
“What is the matter, Toby? What is it you want to tell me?”27   
Of course, Toby cannot reply to this question within 
Monica’s symbolic realm. As a result, he demonstrates the se-
miotic in its purest form—through music. The orchestral ac-
companiment offers a musical response to Monica—a plain-
tive, three measure motif, adagio molto espressivo, slightly 
faster and more expressive, and ma intenso e un poco rubato, 
more intense, with slight disregard to tempo in order to express 
more intimately.28 This passage underscores Toby’s gestures 
as he struggles to “find the words to speak,” semiotically 
speaking (see Figure 2, Appendix B). 
In response, Monica commands Toby to kneel as she 
moves behind him and adopts his stance. In this position, Mon-
ica “sings” for Toby, exclaiming, “Monica, Monica, can’t you 
see, that my heart is bleeding, bleeding for you? I loved you 
Monica, all my life, with all my breath, with all my blood,”29 
expressing the words that she believes he is trying to say—or, 
at least, the words that she wishes he would say. This bizarre, 
one-sided exchange of vows puts Toby in a subjugated posi-
tion, both by what Monica says and, even more so, how she 
says it. As Jensen-Moulton so astutely observes, “If Toby were 
not a mute character, surely he would be the one asking Mon-
ica to dance the waltz, but Monica is already putting words 
into Toby’s mouth, both literally and figuratively.”30   
As the music of the Waltz continues to swell and the 
tempo accelerates poco ritenuto poi subito animando, Mon-
ica’s vocal lines ascend and the orchestra’s lines descend sim-
ultaneously, culminating at a fortississimo dynamic. Then, the 
                                                
26 Menotti, The Medium, 65. 
27 Ibid., 65. 
28 Ibid., 66. 
29 Ibid., 66. 
30 Jensen-Moulton, “Muteness and Masculinity” 30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furman Humanities Review 
 10 
orchestra quickly interjects a fortepiano C# minor triad while 
a B-C# dyad is held with a fermata, as Toby’s stage directions 
indicate that he is to hide his face into his arms.31 (see Figure 
3, Appendix B).  
At this break, Monica’s trance is finally broken. She 
“stares at him, completely bewildered” and asks, “Why, Toby! 
You’re not crying, are you?”32 The Waltz theme resumes, ten-
eramente and pianississimo, tenderly and very very softly. 
“With great tenderness”33 and with a moment of unexpected 
lucidity, Monica expresses the most poignant line in the entire 
opera: “Toby, I want you to know that you have the most beau-
tiful voice in the world!”34 Julia Kristeva’s research posits that 
signifying practices, such as myth, poetry, and art, cannot be 
reduced to language objects.35 Correspondingly, “Monica’s 
Waltz,” with this touching line in particular, is full of signifi-
cance that cannot be expressed in simplistic terms. Although 
the majority of “Monica’s Waltz” showcases Monica’s delu-
sional trance, this singular declaration shows us that Monica 
truly cares for Toby and that she believes his semiotic “voice” 
to be more beautiful than any other symbolic “voice.”  
“Monica’s Waltz,” as well as the entirety of The Me-
dium, depicts a semiotic mode of communication through 
Toby’s deictic gestures, touches, expressions, and most im-
portantly, the musical accompaniment itself. While the semi-
otic is Toby’s preferred mode of communication, we must not 
forget that the symbolic plays a role in the opera as well, as the 
interrelated natures of the semiotic and the symbolic are al-
ways a factor in any linguistic expression. While Toby privi-
leges the semiotic, the world in which he lives privileges the 
symbolic, and any semiotic expression that Toby offers is met 
                                                
31 Menotti, The Medium, 69. 
32 Ibid., 69. 
33 Ibid., 69. 
34 Ibid., 70. 
35 Kristeva, Revolutions, 32. 
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with responses that are comprised primarily of a symbolic na-
ture. Toby’s reliance upon the semiotic makes for an enhanced 
operatic experience, as it expresses ideas in both the symbolic 
and semiotic modes. Furthermore, his command of semiotic 
language allows Menotti’s opera to embrace a full range of 
expression that cannot be accessed through the symbolic alone. 
  
The Trauma of Muteness 
 
Most interestingly, it is only after Baba accuses Toby 
that the echoes, originally produced by Monica, reappear with-
out any traceable source. Monica’s cries of “Mother, Mother, 
are you there?” were originally used to enhance Mrs. Nolan’s 
séance experience. The score indicates that these refrains, as 
well as Monica’s imitation laughter of the Gobineau child, are 
to be sung by a “voice” off-stage.36 These echoes defy expla-
nation; when she first hears them, Monica herself stops and 
asks “What?” while the echoes of her own voice repeat with-
out her doing.37 What is the source of these echoes? Where do 
they come from? This “voice that cries out”38 demonstrates 
key components of Cathy Caruth’s theory on trauma.  
Caruth posits that the force of trauma is intertwined 
with the violence of the unknowable—a violence that stems 
from “the inextricability of the story of one’s life from the 
story of a death, an impossible and necessary double telling.”39 
This trauma is expressed through an unknowable voice, which 
tells the story of a former wound in an attempt to bring atten-
tion to an inaccessible reality expressed through a language 
that “defies, even as it claims, our understanding.”40 While this 
unknowable other can be worked through, it will never go 
                                                
36 Menotti, The Medium, 56. 
37 Ibid., 56. 
38 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 3. 
39 Ibid., 8. 
40 Ibid., 5. 
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away entirely and manifests itself into different traumatic ex-
pressions.41 Furthermore, the unconscious will prompt us to 
return to the same scene of our trauma so that we may better 
understand it,42 prompting a double wound.  
As the opera unfolds, we learn more about Toby’s 
traumatic experiences. Baba references the way that she took 
him in, singing, “I found you, a little starving gipsy, roaming 
the streets of Budapest without a tongue to speak your hun-
ger.”43 This gives us an indication of the trauma that Toby ex-
perienced before the opera even began. Jensen-Moulton pro-
poses a possible explanation regarding Toby’s history: While 
the score indicates that The Medium is to take place in “a 
squalid room in a flat on the outskirts of a great city,”44 Baba’s 
reference to Budapest suggests that the opera might take place 
in Budapest. Additionally, while the score indicates that the 
opera is to take place “in our time,”45 the nature of Toby’s dis-
ability suggests that the opera could take place in a setting with 
which Menotti would have been familiar—post-World War II 
Hungary.46 World War II left a high concentration of Roma 
(gypsies) in post-war Hungary. Believing the Roma to be ra-
cially inferior, the Nazis targeted them in a similar way as they 
targeted the Jews, subjecting them to “arbitrary internment, 
forced labor, and mass murder.”47 Therefore, it is very possible 
that German authorities cut out Toby’s tongue in an act of ra-
cial persecution.  
While adopting Toby as her ward may paint Baba as 
a humanitarian, she is anything but; Toby’s exposure to trau-
matic violence does not end under Baba’s guardianship. After 
                                                
41 Ibid., 3. 
42 Ibid., 4. 
43 Menotti, The Medium, 73. 
44 Ibid., i. 
45 Ibid., i. 
46 Jensen-Moulton, “Muteness and Masculinity,” 16. 
47 Ibid., 16. 
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Baba is spooked by the throat incident at the séance, she tar-
gets Toby as her scapegoat and tells Monica, “Just because he 
cannot speak we take him for a half-wit.”48 Later however, 
when Baba confronts Toby about the incident, she tells him, 
“If I hadn’t taken you with me, who would have cared for you, 
poor little half-wit?”49 The first of these references suggests 
that Baba realizes that Toby is more intelligent than she lets 
on and that his intelligence renders him capable of slyness. 
The second reference suggests that despite this knowledge, 
Baba regularly belittles Toby’s intellect as a means of subju-
gation and control.  
The pivotal scene of abuse occurs when Baba de-
mands from Toby an explanation for the supernatural hand she 
felt and the echoes she heard. She sings frantically, “But first 
you must tell me, did you have anything to do with what hap-
pened that night? Did you see anything? A light? A shape? 
Wake up! Did you? Stop staring at me! Did you?”50 At this 
point, “with uncontrolled fury,” the tempo suddenly slows 
poco ritenuto for dramatic effect, then quickens accelerando 
poco a poco fino al tempo primo, until it reaches the original 
tempo again.51 Baba stops singing and instead begins to yell, 
“Ah, so— You don’t want to answer. You’re trying to frighten 
me. I’ll show you, damn little gipsy, I’ll make you talk! I’ll 
make you talk! You cannot get away from me! I’ll make you 
spit out blood, I will. I’ll make you spit out blood!”52 The stage 
directions indicate, “She goes to the cupboard and brings out 
a long whip. Toby runs away from her in terror. She chases 
him around the table. Toby trips and falls near the couch.”53 
At this point, Baba whips Toby in time to the dissonant chords 
                                                
48 Menotti, The Medium, 49. 
49 Ibid., 73. 
50 Ibid., 80-81. 
51 Ibid., 81. 
52 Ibid., 81-83. 
53 Ibid., 82-83. 
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as she screams “So you won’t answer, eh!” six times.54 Of 
course Toby cannot answer—it is difficult for anyone to an-
swer in the midst of physical abuse—and especially more so 
for someone who is mute.   
At the climax of the play, Baba expels Toby from the 
home and orders Monica to her room. After Monica exits the 
stage, again a voice sings the “Mother, Mother, are you there?” 
refrain.55 While these voices haunt Baba, they constitute not 
her traumatic voice, but Toby’s—a “ plea by an other who is 
asking to be seen and heard”56 The manifestation of Toby’s 
trauma haunts Baba precisely because Baba is responsible for 
much of Toby’s trauma, and as Caruth maintains, “one’s own 
trauma is tied up with the trauma of another.”57 Because Baba 
is driven insane by “the ghost” who touched her throat and 
who haunts her with Monica’s voice, this suggests that Toby’s 
trauma has been translated into Baba’s own trauma. Caruth 
maintains, “Knowing and not knowing are entangled in the 
language of trauma”58 ; because Baba doesn’t know who the 
“ghost” is, and because she doesn’t understand where the ech-
oes come from, what began as Toby’s trauma has become hers 
as well.   
At the end of the opera, Toby reenters the house and 
sneaks to the trunk where Baba’s costumes are kept. He acci-
dentally slams the lid of the trunk shut. Baba wakes up in a 
panic and asks, “Who’s there? Who’s there? Answer me!”59 
She arms herself with a gun for self-protection and continues 
to demand a response, crying, “Speak out or I’ll shoot! I’ll 
shoot! I’ll shoot!”60 Toby, of course, cannot “answer,” nor can 
                                                
54 Ibid., 83-84. 
55 Ibid., 105. 
56 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 9. 
57 Ibid., 8. 
58 Ibid., 4. 
59 Menotti, The Medium, 117. 
60 Ibid., 118. 
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he “speak out.” When he moves behind the puppet theater, 
Baba sees the curtain of the theater move and shoots into it, 
killing him. The final moments of the opera feature Baba on 
her knees, leaning over Toby’s body, whispering, “Was it 
you?”61 Baba’s question phrases the truth that she wants to ex-
tract from the mute Toby—whether or not the supernatural 
echoes were of his doing. The reality is that it was Toby’s do-
ing—indirectly. When Baba cries, “I’ve killed the ghost!,”62  
she isn’t referring to a ghost in the traditional sense of the 
word; she refers to the manifestation of Toby’s trauma, which 
haunts her and drives her to near insanity.  
Toby’s story conveys trauma not just as a series of un-
canny, unknowable repetitions, but as a witness to the un-
knowable otherness of the wounded, inner voice that longs to 
bring attention to the trauma that has not been reconciled.63 
Because Toby’s manifestations of trauma are intertwined with 
Baba’s psyche, one might ask if the traumatic elements within 
The Medium stem from Toby’s abuse and death, or from 
Baba’s administration of pain upon him and her subsequent 
experiences with the manifestations of his past violent experi-
ences? Caruth, who suggests “a kind of double telling, the os-
cillation between a crisis of death and the correlative crisis of 
life: between the story of the unbearable nature of an event and 
the story of the unbearable nature of its survival,”64 might ar-
gue that the traumatic elements of the opera stem from the in-
tertwined relationship of trauma that Toby and Baba share. 
  
The Haunting Uncanniness of the Voice 
 
 Because the theories of Julia Kristeva and Cathy 
Caruth stem from the psychoanalytic genealogy of Sigmund 
                                                
61 Ibid., 121. 
62 Ibid., 119. 
63 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 3. 
64 Ibid., 7. 
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Freud, I would like to conclude my paper with an application 
of his 1919 essay, “Das Unheimliche” (“The Uncanny”). 
Freud defines the word “uncanny” (unheimlich) by explaining, 
“[W]hat is ‘uncanny’ is frightening precisely because it is not 
known and familiar.”65 He goes on to explain that while many 
situations can be uncanny, the idea of the “double,” that is, 
when “there is the constant recurrence of similar situations, a 
same face, or character trait, or twist of fortune, or a same 
crime,”66 situations become extremely haunting. This déjà vu, 
the  “recurrence of similar situations” is precisely what takes 
place within The Medium. While the opera takes place in the 
comfort of the domestic sphere, the sourceless echoes that re-
peat throughout the opera are unfamiliar, unexplainable, and 
therefore uncanny, which destabilizes the familiarity of the 
home and renders it an unsettling setting.  
It is not the occult itself that frightens Baba; what 
frightens her, rather, is knowledge of the reality of the super-
natural, a reality that she previously devalued. In an attempt to 
find a natural explanation for the sourceless echoes, Baba tar-
gets Toby as the scapegoat and cries, “[H]e knows a great deal. 
He knows much more than we think. There is something un-
canny about him. He sees things we don’t see.”67 Although 
Baba is experienced with the occult (or, at least, convincing 
her patrons that she is experienced with the occult), the source-
less echoes lead her to fully believe in the paranormal. As a 
result, by the end of the opera, she believes that Toby in par-
ticular has direct access to the realm of the supernatural.  
The feeling of uncanniness detected by the characters 
in the opera permeates into the audience as well. Freud writes, 
“It is true that the writer creates a kind of uncertainty in us [the 
                                                
65 Freud, Sigmund, “The Uncanny.” Literary Theory: An Anthol-
ogy. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. (Malden: Blackwell, 
2004), 118. 
66 Ibid., 425. 
67 Menotti, The Medium, 49, emphasis added 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Margaret McCurry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
audience] in the beginning by not letting us know, no doubt 
purposely, whether he is taking us into the real world or into a 
purely fantastic one of his own creation.”68 When the mysteri-
ous echoes begin to haunt Baba, it is difficult for the audience 
to ascertain whether or not they are simply the product of her 
own imagination. When the other characters also hear the ech-
oes, however, we realize that these echoes are not merely the 
manifestation of Baba’s psychosis; something much more sin-
ister is at play which threatens all the characters. Freud con-
tinues, acknowledging, “He [the composer] has, of course, a 
right to do either; and if he chooses to stage his action in a 
world peopled with spirits, demons, and ghosts . . . we must 
bow to his decision and treat his setting as though it were real 
for as long as we put ourselves into his hands.”69 The Medium 
would be uncanny enough if Baba was the only one who heard 
echoed voices in her head; but by bringing these echoes into 
the realm of realism so that the echoes are heard by all signif-
icantly raises the level of uncanniness.  
 
Privileging Semiotic Language, its Trauma, and its  
Uncanniness 
 
 The psychoanalytic significance of The Medium lies 
within Toby in both his disability that lends itself to a privi-
leging of semiotic language, as well as his past and present 
trauma. The Medium is a text that readily lends itself to a thor-
ough psychoanalytic reading. Perhaps this is because Menotti 
believed the opera to be: 
 
a play of ideas. It describes the tragedy of a woman 
caught between two worlds, a world of reality, which 
she cannot wholly comprehend, and a supernatural 
world, in which she cannot believe. Every character in 
                                                
68 Freud, “The Uncanny,” 423. 
69 Ibid., 423. 
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it has symbolic dimensions: Baba of Doubt, the three 
clients of Faith, Monica of Love and Toby of the Un-
known.70  
 
Menotti’s interpretation of his own opera may be the reason 
why The Medium can be placed in conversation with psycho-
analytic texts with such ease. I disagree, however, with Me-
notti’s claim that Toby is simply a symbol of the Unknown. 
While it is true that his characterization as a mute establishes 
him as a pivotal symbolic figure in the opera, we must not for-
get that he is a multi-dimensional character—he is more than 
his disability and he is more than his symbolic value. Because 
Toby’s disability has forced him to privilege the semiotic and 
because his trauma has manifested itself on the stage, Toby, as 
well as The Medium itself, is multi-expressional.  
  
                                                
70 Jensen-Moulton 18, “Muteness and Masculinity,” as quoted in 
Gruen 69. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Margaret McCurry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Appendix A 
 
Text to “Monica’s Waltz” 
 
Bravo! And after the theater, supper and dance. 
Music! Um-pa-pa, um-pa-pa, 
Up in the sky someone is playing a trombone and a 
guitar. 
Red is your tie, and in your velvetine coat you hide a 
star. 
Monica, Monica, dance the waltz, 
Monica, Monica, dance the waltz, 
Follow me, moon and sun, 
Keep time with me, one-two-three-one. 
If you’re not shy, pin up my hair with your star, and 
buckle my shoe. 
And when you fly, please hold on tight to my waist, 
I’m flying with you. 
O, Monica, Monica, dance the waltz, 
Monica, Monica, dance the waltz, 
Follow me, moon and sun, 
Follow me, follow, follow me, 
Follow me, follow, follow me. 
 
[Pause, quasi recitative] 
What is the matter, Toby? 
What is it you want to tell me? 
Kneel down before me, 
And now tell me. 
 
[Toby kneeling before her as though he were speak-
ing] 
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Monica, Monica can’t you see 
That my heart is bleeding, bleeding for you? 
I loved you, Monica, all my life, 
With all my breath, with all my blood. 
You haunt the mirror of my sleep, 
You are my night. You are my light 
And the jailer of my day. 
 
[Monica stands before Toby again, playing] 
How dare you scoundrel talk to me like that! 
Don’t you know who I am? 
I’m the Queen of Aroundel! 
I shall have you put in chains! 
 
[Toby kneeling again before her] 
You are my princess, you are my queen, 
And I’m only Toby, one of your slaves, 
And still I love you and always loved you 
With all my breath, with all my blood. 
I love your laughter, 
I love your hair, 
I love your deep and nocturnal eyes, 
I love your soft hands, 
So white and winged, 
I love the slender branch of your throat. 
 
[Monica turns] 
Toby, don’t speak to me like that! 
You make my head swim. 
 
[Toby kneels] 
Monica, Monica, fold me in your satin gown. 
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Monica, Monica, give me your mouth. 
Monica, Monica, fall in my arms! 
 
[Quasi-recitative: Toby hides his face, Monica no-
tices] 
Why, Toby! You’re not crying are you? 
Toby, I want you to know that you have 
The most beautiful voice in the world. 
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Figure 1: Gian Carlo Menotti, The Medium, page 65, measure 27 
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Figure 2: Gian Carlo Menotti, The Medium, page 66, measure 28. No-
tice the sustained rests in the vocal line.  
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Figure 3: Gian Carlo Menotti, The Medium, page 69, measure 60 
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 THE DIVINE SOPHIA:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH AND HELLENISTIC 
THOUGHT IN THE CHRISTOLOGY OF 
THE NEW TESTAMENT 
  
James Bergman 
 
The tradition of wisdom literature was a prominent 
theme within the Jewish Old Testament. This emphasis on the 
idea of wisdom continued into the apocrypha, which detailed 
the presence of a personified Wisdom that helped God create 
the heavens and earth. In the New Testament, Jesus is the cen-
ter of the wisdom literature, becoming the teacher of proverbs 
and parables in the Gospels and in the letter of James, yet also 
the personified Wisdom in John. In general, both the wisdom 
teachings and the Wisdom Christology of the New Testament 
stemmed from the fundamentals of first century Jewish 
thought, showing a strong continuity between Judaism of the 
emerging Christian movement as it is reflected in the writings 
of the New Testament. The impact of the Israelite and Jewish 
wisdom tradition has been underappreciated in New Testa-
ment scholarship, to its own detriment. As a result, under-
standing the influence of wisdom literature and first century 
Judaism on the authors of the New Testament allows a more 
thorough consideration of the ideology behind the theology 
that appears in the New Testament theme of wisdom. 
 
Background of Wisdom Literature 
 
Two streams of thought in first century Judaism con-
verge in the New Testament, creating an amalgamation of 
“Palestinian” and Hellenistic Judaism.1 These two strands, as 
                                                
1 John J. Collins and Daniel C. Harlow, Early Judaism: A Compre-
hensive Overview (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 
2012), 221. 
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evidenced by the continuing influence of the Old Testament 
and the apocrypha, greatly influenced the writings of the New 
Testament in the Epistle of James and the Gospel of John, re-
spectively. The theological and cultural underpinnings behind 
the development of apocryphal wisdom continued for the writ-
ers of the New Testament. Therefore, the lens of the wisdom 
literature of the Old Testament and apocrypha grants greater 
clarity to a reading of the New Testament.  
 While it is impossible to establish the common per-
ception of the wisdom literature in first century Judaism, the 
ideas of the wisdom sayings and personified Wisdom were 
clearly important to Jewish writers of the era. Greek philoso-
phers of the ancient world gave moral instruction, and the writ-
ers of the Old Testament claimed this idea as well.2 The Isra-
elite wisdom tradition does not focus solely on the cultivation 
of the intellect, but rather on the practicalities of life. By the 
time of the apocrypha (200 BCE to 100 CE),3 both Egyptian 
and Hellenistic wisdom began to be included with Jewish 
ideas, forming the basis of Wisdom of Solomon and Sirach.4 
Greek and Egyptian wisdom would likely have been con-
cerned with similar aspects of life to ancient Judaism, so bor-
rowing among the wisdom literature was a prominent phe-
nomenon. The wisdom literature shows a diverse background 
of Jewish study, combining many kinds of knowledge and ap-
propriating non-Jewish concepts.5 Even in the most nativist, 
“Palestinian” circles of Second Temple Judaism, the over-
whelming influence of Hellenism would have somewhat in-
spired their ideas and thoughts. 
                                                
2 Joel B. Green, ed. The CEB Study Bible with Apocrypha (Nash-
ville, TN: Common English Bible, 2013), 108 AP. 
3 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 3. 
4 Green, 108 AP. 
5 Terrence Y. Mullins, "Jewish Wisdom Literature in the New Tes-
tament" in Journal of Biblical Literature 68, no. 4 (1949): 336. 
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Wisdom in Second Temple texts became a reflection back 
upon the Torah as it developed in significance during the pe-
riod. The idea of wisdom evolved to encompass more than 
pithy proverbs or general life advice. The apocryphal litera-
ture, and therefore a branch of first century Judaism, saw Wis-
dom through observance of the Torah.6 This tradition of wis-
dom literature illuminates the continuing importance of 
Wisdom in Jewish life in the time of the apocrypha, and al-
lowed the Jewish biblical interpreters to take part in a contin-
uing tradition while adapting it.7 This continued in the New 
Testament, as the Christian authors incorporated Jewish ideas 
from throughout the Second Temple Period. 
 
James as the “Proverbs of the New Testament” 
 
 The book of James is often referred to as the “Proverbs 
of the New Testament” by scholars and biblical commentators. 
While the format of the book of James suggests an epistolary 
nature, in content it is paraenesis, or ethical instruction.8 
James uses ethical instruction from each era of scripture, in-
cluding Leviticus, the apocrypha, and the Gospel of Matthew. 
James seems to have known and used the books of the apoc-
rypha, passing on the tradition of moral wisdom.9 However, 
instead of quoting the apocrypha as scripture, he simply incor-
porates those ideas into his writing. This New Testament work 
integrates the ideas of first century Judaism, the culture and 
background of the early church. If the epistle of James was 
truly written by the brother of Jesus, it follows that Jesus 
would likely have been intensely familiar with these ideas as 
well. The apocrypha formed another layer in the religious 
scholarship of the early Christian communities. Perhaps the 
                                                
6 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 174. 
7 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 175. 
8 Gary Holloway, "James as New Testament Wisdom Litera-
ture," Leaven 8, no. 2 (2000): 1. 
9 Holloway, 2. 
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New Testament could even be viewed as another wave of 
apocryphal literature, focused on the spiritual realm and a new 
wave of covenantal theology through Jesus Christ. This line of 
reasoning would explain the fact that, in general, apocryphal 
texts were preserved by the Christians, not the Jews.  
However, the epistle of James focuses overall on the 
everyday practice of “wisdom from above” (3:17). James puts 
forth a call to action (2:14-24), continuing the traditions of the 
Jewish wisdom literature. He contrasts the arrogant wisdom of 
the world with the heavenly wisdom that produces the “harvest 
of righteousness” (3:18), providing a virtue list like those of 
the Greek moralists.10 James also appears to paraphrase the 
Sermon on the Mount, which allows him to preserve and re-
work the words of Jesus. Overall, James “takes conventional 
moral wisdom, both Jewish and Greek, and redefines it in light 
of the incarnation and sure return of Christ.”11 This also con-
tinues and redefines the apocalyptic and covenantal theologies 
of first century Judaism. 
 
Other Wisdom References in the New Testament 
 
Other parts of the New Testament also deal with the 
Old Testament concept of Wisdom. The parables of Jesus were 
a part of the tradition of wisdom teaching. This also shows the 
mosaic of Middle Eastern thought within first century Juda-
ism, as it is a uniquely Jewish idea with Hellenistic influence.12 
Jesus used wisdom techniques when he taught, acting himself 
as a sage of the Old Testament wisdom literature.13 The prov-
erb sayings of Jesus show that the New Testament continues 
the Old Testament manner of expression, as Jesus personifies 
                                                
10 Holloway, “James as New Testament Wisdom Literature,” 6. 
11 Holloway, 6. 
12 Green, The CEB Study Bible, 108 AP. 
13 Mullins, “Jewish Wisdom Literature in the New Testament,” 
337. 
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Wisdom in Luke 7:35 and 11:49.14 References to Christ’s in-
volvement in creation are cloaked in the garb of the wisdom 
texts of the Old Testament. The first century Jewish perspec-
tive and text on the nature of Wisdom became central in defin-
ing the identity of Christ in the incipient religion. Jesus himself 
refers to the divine Wisdom, saying that “Wisdom is proved 
right by her actions” (Matt 11:19). Jesus eventually is equated 
Wisdom itself as part of the Christology of the first century.15 
A major foundation for this theology comes from Matthew 
23:34, in which Jesus substitutes “I” for the understood idea 
that Wisdom grants understanding and sends teachers forth. 
Considering the first century Jewish perspective on Wisdom, 
this declaration is viewed by some to be as bold as the pardon-
ing of sins by Jesus. 
Within Christian text and tradition, Jesus is identified 
not only with goodness but with wisdom. Jesus is referred to 
as the Wisdom of God by Paul on numerous occasions (1 Cor 
1:24-30, 2:7, 8:6; Col 1:26-27, 2:3, 4:5). Jesus is called the 
“wisdom of God” in 1 Cor 1:24, and the image of the invisible 
God in Col 1:15. Thus, the author of John’s idea of logos was 
inculcated in the personification of Wisdom as Jesus in Paul.16 
This Greek term contained the Jewish concept of Wisdom. 
While both the proverb and wisdom sayings of Jesus were con-
tained within the tradition of Jewish wisdom literature, the 
idea that Jesus is the divine Wisdom was a uniquely Christian 
development. Likewise, the development of the idea that Je-
sus, as the divine Wisdom, is the “firstborn” (Col 1:15) of cre-
ation draws heavily from both the Wisdom of Proverbs and 
intertestamental texts; as a result, the apocrypha influenced 
Paul’s perspective on Jesus’ divine nature. Jewish culture of 
the first century held the birthright as a preeminent belief, and 
                                                
14 Mullins, 339. 
15 Mullins, 337. 
16 Daniel Boyarin, "The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish Binitarian-
ism and the Prologue to John" in The Harvard Theological Re-
view 94, no. 3 (2001): 256. 
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this displays itself in the New Testament texts of Jesus.17 Je-
sus, as the divine Wisdom, is the firstborn of all creation, as 
she is described in Proverbs 8:22-30 and numerous apocryphal 
texts. This either informed or reflected the Christological 
viewpoints concerning Jesus’ divinity. Jesus was the firstborn 
of creation, from God, and this message is evident throughout 
the New Testament, as in Romans 8:29, which describes Jesus 
as the firstborn among brethren.18 The idea that Jesus was a 
part of creation becomes even more important as the trinitarian 
theology developed.19 The Jewish cultural understanding of 
the firstborn influenced a New Testament theme within the 
Wisdom literature. 
Additionally, the book of Hebrews contains the idea 
of a personified Wisdom, as it shares a multitude of themes 
with the ethical and theological facets of the tradition of Wis-
dom/Sophia.20 Christ is called “The radiance of God’s Glory” 
(Heb 1:3), like his identification in Col 1:15. This idea draws 
itself directly from the book of Wisdom of Solomon in the 
apocrypha, which called Wisdom “a reflection of the eternal 
light, [an] untarnished mirror of God’s active power, and im-
age of his goodness” (Wis 7:26).21 In the same way, Hebrews 
continues the covenantal theology of the apocryphal wisdom 
literature. Jesus is the fulfillment of the old covenant and has 
surpassed the requirements of the Torah (4:14-16), the focus 
of first century Judaism. 
 
The Prologue of John: Logos 
                                                
17 Robert Hamerton-Kelly, Pre-existence, Wisdom, and the Son of 
Man: a Study of the Idea of Pre-existence in the New Testament 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. 
18 Hamerton-Kelly, 2. 
19 Hamerton-Kelly, 5. 
20 Mary Ann Beavis and HyeRan Kim-Cragg, Hebrews (Wisdom 
Commentary Series) (Collegeville: Michael Glazier, 2015), 10. 
21 Beavis and Kim-Cragg, Hebrews, 12. 
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 Since the inchoate stages of Christianity, a connection 
between Jesus and the personified Wisdom of the Old Testa-
ment was manifest. This is evidenced by the fact that some of 
the early church fathers, such as Philo of Alexandria, viewed 
Jesus as the Old Testament figure of Wisdom.22 The prologue 
of John can likewise be viewed as continuing the tradition of 
wisdom literature in the Old Testament and apocrypha, per-
haps a Jewish work that became central to the Christology of 
Christianity.23 Ostensibly, the idea of logos is an abstract con-
cept displaying the separation of Christianity from Judaism at 
an early stage of the eventual parting of the ways. Many schol-
ars claim that this Hellenistic idea of Christianity is far re-
moved from the Palestinian Judaism of the time.24 As seen in 
the apocrypha, this perceived separation is unsubstantiated by 
the texts of the late Second Temple Jews. In the first century, 
Judaism and Hellenism (and therefore Christianity) were 
closely tied:25 this narrative began to shift only with the devel-
opments of Rabbinic Judaism as a nativist reaction.26 Regard-
less, it seems that many Christian communities wished to be 
identified with Judaism.27 Therefore, the Johannine idea of the 
logos is a Jewish one, given new meaning within the Christol-
ogy of the era. 
There are several similarities between logos in the 
Prologue of John and the personified Wisdom of the Jewish 
scriptures. There was a close connection of the Prologue with 
certain themes of early and later Jewish Wisdom literature in 
such biblical and apocryphal texts as Proverbs 8:22-31, Sirach 
24, the Wisdom of Solomon, and Baruch 3:37-4:1. This line 
of reasoning shows that John belongs in the same genre, with 
                                                
22 Boyarin, “The Gospel of the Memra,” 249. 
23 Boyarin, 265. 
24 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 398. 
25 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 397. 
26 Boyarin, “The Gospel of the Memra,” 246. 
27 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 402. 
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thematic parallels, as well as parallel metaphoric language to 
the Johannine Prologue.28 An evolution of these parallels, the 
idea of the divine logos as Wisdom, is found personified in the 
living Jesus. The idea of the Logos/Sophia as the mediator be-
tween God’s transcendence and imminence was widespread in 
first century Judaism.29 It is a natural evolution of this Middle 
Platonic theory that the Son of God assumed the role of the 
divine Wisdom from the Old Testament and apocrypha- the 
idea of the logos has its roots in the Wisdom literature of the 
Old Testament- to allow a theology that creates a transcendent 
yet imminent God.30 The idea of mediators between heaven 
and earth became increasingly discussed in first century Juda-
ism.31 The emphasis on angels and other heavenly beings came 
to the forefront of Second Temple Jewish theology, and the 
ideas of Sophia, Logos, and the incarnate Jesus are all aspects 
of this doctrinal development. 
The observance of the Torah was similarly a central 
theme to the common Judaism of the first century, which un-
derwent a fundamental shift through the New Testament texts, 
specifically John. Second Temple Judaism saw Wisdom as the 
representation of a shift toward the renewed importance on the 
Torah, as evidenced by numerous apocryphal and pseudepig-
raphal works.32 In Sirach 24, Wisdom finds a home in Israel 
because the Torah is being followed. However, in 1 Enoch and 
2 Esdras, Wisdom is driven back to heaven because of the un-
righteousness of Israel. The wisdom literature of the New Tes-
tament was aimed at addressing this concern among the early 
Christians.33 A new set of explanations emerged among the 
                                                
28 Boyarin, 262. 
29 Boyarin, 248. 
30 Boyarin, 255. 
31 Green, The CEB Study Bible, 109 AP. 
32 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 174. 
33 Mullins, “Jewish Wisdom Literature in the New Testament,” 
338. 
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early Christian writers and communities to explain the trans-
formation of theology in Christianity. The Epistle of James 
writes in this same tradition of wisdom literature to show that 
the Torah has shifted to the new set of instructions from Jesus, 
centered on living a faithful life.34 While God’s election of Is-
rael, and therefore Israel’s obedience to the Torah, are central 
aspects of Second Temple Judaism, James changed the narra-
tive to focus on the obedience of faith in Christ.35 In the pro-
logue of John, this notion is further intensified. Here, Jesus 
becomes the divine Wisdom, and therefore the Torah, which 
had been the center of Jewish life. As a result, Wisdom litera-
ture was used as a focal point for the covenantal shift from 
early Second Temple Judaism, to first century Judaism, to 
Christianity. Christian messianism collided with Jewish mon-
otheism when Jesus began to be identified with the personified 
Logos. 
This emphasis on following the Torah implicitly con-
tinued a debate of what it meant to be Jewish. It seems that the 
“common Judaism” of the first century was focused on follow-
ing the Torah and attempted to follow its mitzvot.36 Because of 
the creation of the Jewish diaspora, each community differed 
in its understanding of how best to observe the Torah, based 
on geographical location, socio-economic status of the Jews in 
the area, and religious requirements from civic leaders. This 
became necessary because Jews wanted to participate in the 
Hellenistic culture around them while maintaining a distinct 
Jewish identity.37 The fact that these works would prominently 
feature non-Greek ideas perhaps illuminates the continuing 
struggle for identity for Second Temple Jews. Most Jewish 
works written in Greek emphasized the superiority of Judaism 
                                                
34 Holloway, “James as New Testament Wisdom Literature,” 6. 
35 Ibid.,, 7. 
36 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 370. 
37 Ibid., 367. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furman Humanities Review 
 36 
over Greek culture.38 As an example of a Jewish work, John 
recognizes major marks of Jewish identity, in the Torah, Tem-
ple, Sabbath, and Festivals, but fulfills and replaces these with 
Jesus. 
This understanding of the relationship between Jewish 
and Gentile culture differed in other parts of the New Testa-
ment, in which the historical continuity between Israel and the 
Christian movement is emphasized in Acts and the Gospels. 
The apostles are the new leaders of Israel, but God still uses 
the Jewish people, even as participation in Christianity is no 
longer limited to those who are Jews by birth but open to “an-
yone in every nation who fears him and does what is right” by 
“believing in Jesus and receiving forgiveness of sins through 
his name.” (Acts 10:34, 43). As a result, Gentiles do not have 
to convert to the “nation” of the Jewish people by following 
their customs.39 The exemption of Gentiles from circumcision 
does not mean the dismissal of the Torah, but the fulfillment 
of its true, prophetic intention. However, the Jewish notion of 
covenant election was radically spiritualized when Gentiles 
were welcomed in without having to be circumcised, changing 
the understanding of the continuity between these groups. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The New Testament theme of Wisdom, along with the 
idea that Jesus is the personification of the divine Sophia, 
lends credence to the idea that the early Christians did not view 
themselves as distinct from other first century Jews, but rather 
a development upon the ideals of the Second Temple period. 
Examining all these facets of Second Temple Judaism presents 
a clearer picture of the way in which wisdom literature was 
incorporated into the canon and message of the New Testa-
ment. The idea of Jesus as a teacher of Proverbs and parables 
                                                
38 Collins and Harlow, Early Judaism, 237. 
39 Ibid., 404. 
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was a direct development from the Jewish emphasis on such 
forms of thought in the first century. Moreover, the identifica-
tion of Jesus as the divine logos stems from both an Old Tes-
tament and apocryphal understanding of the interactions be-
tween God and mankind. As is evident from the wisdom 
literature of the New Testament, both normative Judaism and 
reflection upon the idea of Wisdom in Jewish circles interacted 
to create the theology of Christianity. Overall, this understand-
ing reveals the level to which Christians built their Christology 
from the ideas of their Jewish predecessors, while incorporat-
ing their own Hellenistic understanding. 
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HUME, MIRACLES, AND MATHEMATICS:  
A CASE STUDY FOR THE USE AND PREVALENCE 
OF PROBABILISTIC ARGUMENTATION 
WITHIN BIBLICAL STUDIES 
 
Joshua Brickell 
 
In David Hume's Enquiry, he states: "No testimony is 
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of 
such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than 
the fact, which it endeavours to establish... the superior only 
gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which 
remains, after deducting the inferior."1 Hume's statement may 
seem captive to the realm of philosophy. One could discuss 
how Hume eventually dismisses the existence of miracles not 
because he sees them as theoretically impossible, but rather 
because no witness could ever be reliable enough to show oth-
erwise. But as Holder, Sobel,2 Owen,3 and others argue, 
Hume's statement is inherently mathematical. While these 
scholars have differing opinions as to whether miracles exist 
or not, all interpret Hume's statement in light of Bayes' theo-
rem, a statistical technique developed by Thomas Bayes. In 
this paper, I will analyze the debate about Hume and miracles, 
arguing that under certain conditions the existence of a miracle 
                                                
1 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998): 50. (quoting 
Hume's Enquiry) 
2 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 166-186. 
3 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 187-202. 
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could be rationally accepted. This discussion about Hume will 
serve as a case study, showing how mathematics and specifi-
cally probability can be integral to analyzing important ques-
tions present in philosophy and religion. I will then explore 
more broadly the realm of biblical studies, arguing that bibli-
cal historians frequently employ probabilistic argumentation 
and mathematical reasoning when assessing the truthfulness 
of biblical narratives. Finally, I will suggest that given the case 
study about miracles and the commonplace of probabilistic 
language in biblical studies, having a degree of mathematical 
literacy can be a useful and important tool in dissecting the 
arguments made by biblical historians today. 
   
Hume and Bayes' Theorem 
 
In Rodney Holder's article on Hume and miracles, he 
interprets Hume's statement above to be making an argument 
that draws upon the logic of Bayesian probabilities. Here, 
Hume brings up two significant probabilities: the probability 
of a witness making false testimony, and the a priori probabil-
ity of a miracle occurring. Seeing the probabilities that Hume 
has stressed in his analysis, Holder uses Bayes' Theorem to 
mathematically express Hume's argument. Bayes' Theorem is 
a statistical technique that combines the use of a priori and 
conditional probabilities4 in order to assess the likelihood of 
the event in question. In this case, the central event in question 
is this: what is the probability of a specific miracle having oc-
curred (denoted by the variable "M" in the formulas to follow), 
given an individual's testimony to that specific miracle occur-
ring (denoted "T"). Using these variables, Bayes' Theorem is 
as follows, where  P(T | M) is the conditional probability that 
testimony would be provided given that the miracle occurred, 
and P(T | ~M) is the conditional probability that an individual 
                                                
4 A conditional probability is the probability of event A occurring 
given that event B occurred and is denoted P(A|B). 
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would provide testimony to the miracle occurring given that 
the miracle did not actually occur: 
 ! "	 $) = ' $ " ∗' )' $ " ∗' ) *	' $ ~" ∗'(~)) 
 
Since Hume argues that miracles are intrinsically improbable, 
the P(M) << 1 (a really small number), and the P(~M)=1 (tech-
nically, very close to 1). If the miracle occurs and someone is 
there to see it, it is almost certain that it will get reported, so 
P(T|M) = 1. Using Hume’s assumptions and inserting these 
values, the following is left: 
  ! "	 $) = ! "! " + 	!($|~") 
 
Holder argues that for a miracle to be "rationally acceptable"5 
the probability of the miracle occurring given the testimony 
about that miracle must be greater than 0.5. Using the equation 
above, this means we are looking for what is greater, the a pri-
ori probability that the miracle occurred, or the probability that 
the witness testified to the specific miracle occurring, given 
that the miracle did not actually occur. Mathematically ex-
pressed: 
 
 ! " > 	! $ ~" 	012034567	86906:	01	4	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	07	<450>149, ! " < 	! $ ~" 	012034567	86906:	01	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	07	1>5	<450>149 
 
Notice this is exactly where Hume left us, comparing the prob-
abilities of a miraculous event to the conditional probability of 
false testimony. 
                                                
5 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998):  51. 
(Eq. 3) 
(Eq. 1) 
(Eq. 2) 
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 Now that the basics of Bayes’ Theorem have been laid 
out, in order to assess whether or not Hume’s intuition and ar-
guments against miracles hold weight when expressed mathe-
matically, we must explore the assumptions and simplifica-
tions used by later scholars who agree and disagree with 
Hume’s analysis. Owen, in his article assessing Hume’s argu-
ment and its Bayesian interpretation, makes some assumptions 
that cause him to diverge from Holder. Owen of course holds 
to the basic Bayes’ Theorem presented in equation 1 above. 
However, he then proceeds to use a simplification of equation 
1 in his analysis of Hume’s arguments:6  
 
 
 ! "	 $) = ! $ " ∗ ! "! $ " ∗ ! " + (1 − ! $ " ) ∗ !(~") 
 
Note the only difference here between Holder and Owen is that 
Owen replaces ! $ ~" 	with	(1 − ! $ " ). Owen notes 
that these two expressions are equal so long as ! $ " =	!(~$|~"), where the last conditional probability means that 
the witness testified to any event other than event M, given 
that event M did not occur. As will be seen later, whether or 
not one accepts this as a justifiable becomes crucial in deter-
mining whether or not Hume's logic makes sense mathemati-
cally.  
 The issue with Owen's logic here is his assumption re-
garding the equality above. The variable T refers to a witness 
testifying that the specific event M occurred. So then, the ne-
gation of this statement, ~T, here refers to the same witness 
                                                
6 To keep mathematical notation consistent throughout this paper, I 
have translated Owen’s notation into the notation already expressed 
by Holder. Owen uses the notation as follows:  = H5H5 + (1 − H)(1 − 5) 
(Eq. 4) 
( I ( I ) ( ) (I)() (I) 
( I ) ( I ) 
( I ) 
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making a testimony about some other event occurring. This 
could be any number of possible events, so long as the testi-
mony is not about event M occurring. Thus, the event ~$ ∩~" (meaning not T and not M) would include any possible 
scenarios where the witness testifies about an event other than 
M (or perhaps does not testify at all), and M does not actually 
occur. For example, say event A actually occurred, and the 
witness testified that event B occurred (the witness did not ac-
curately report what happened). This scenario would be con-
sistent with the expression  ~$ ∩ ~", as would a scenario 
where event A actually occurred, and the witness testified that 
event A actually occurred (the witness accurately reported 
what happened). How does this compare to the event $ ∩ "? 
The only scenario consistent with this expression is the sce-
nario where the witness testifies that event M occurred, and 
event M did occur. Given the disparity between the number of 
compatible scenarios with each of these events, it would be 
incredibly unlikely that ! $ " = 	!(~$|~"). Given this, 
why does Owen make this error? If we are being sympathetic 
to Owen here, it appears that he means that the probability that 
the witness would testify to event M giving that M occurred 
should be equal to the probability that the witness would tes-
tify to a different event, say event A, given that event A actu-
ally occurred. Holder argues along a similar vein when noting 
his difference with Owen, saying that by being more careful 
with formulating the language used in describing the variables, 
the matter cannot be simplified the way Owen does.7 It is im-
portant to stress here that Holder and Owen are not doing 
vastly different math: their approaches to this problem are 
quite similar. Rather, Holder is a bit more precise in how he 
defines his terms, and this leads to him rejecting one assump-
tion that Owen makes. 
                                                
7 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998):  52.  
C I ) 
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 As has already been shown, Holder disagrees with the 
way Owen simplifies !($|~"). Holder's logic centers around 
how he defines his terms: "our background knowledge K is 
that W [the witness] is in a position to make a report on what 
occurs and does so. T is, specifically a testimony for M, i.e. 
'W states the M occurred'. But given that M did not occur there 
are many ways for W [the witness] to give a false report... and 
it is most unlikely that the false report W would come up with 
is M."8 This leads Holder to provide the following formula:9 
 
 
 ! $ ~" = ! J	K0?67	4	:4976	<6H><5 ∗ ! 5ℎ6	:4976	<6H><5	J	K0?67	07	$  = (1 − 5) ∗ (1/1) 
 
Again it must be stressed that the difference between Holder 
and Owen is small. All Holder does is recognize that if the 
witness were to give a false report, there are other possible 
false reports other than the exact event M. While the difference 
in their assumptions is small, this can produce a large effect 
on the end results. Factoring Holder's assumption into equa-
tion 2 and rearranging terms we have the following: 
 
 
 ! " > 1 − 5 ∗ 11  012034567	4	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	341	86	<450>1499N	4336H562, 
 ! " < 	 1 − 5 ∗ 11  	012034567	4	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	3411>5	86	<450>1499N	4336H562 
                                                
8 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998): 52.  
9 n here is the endless numbers of false reports that one could 
choose from. 
(Eq. 6) 
(Eq. 5) 
( I ) ( ) ( 
( ) ( ) (-) 
( ) ( ) (-) 
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Now Holder assumes that n would be sufficiently large, sug-
gesting that there are a multitude of false reports to choose 
from. However, Holder's argument goes too far here, as it 
would be more likely that there are only a couple other expla-
nations that one could be reasonably expected to testify to. For 
example, if one saw a healing and testified to a miracle occur-
ring, there would be a couple other ways to possibly testify 
about the event: the work of a particular medicine, or the care 
of a doctor. So for our case, n would be greater than 1, but not 
very large. Even with this adjustment to Holder's argument, he 
still seems to have supplied a way in which one could ration-
ally accept that a miracle has occurred. This is not the same as 
saying that Holder has proved that a particular miracle has oc-
curred, or that this formula could determine if a specific event 
was a miracle. Rather, it is a response to Hume's earlier state-
ment from his Enquiry, that in certain cases it may be rational 
to accept the existence of a miracle based on witness testi-
mony.   
 
Objections to Hume and the use of Bayesian Statistics 
 
 So far our discussion around Hume's argument against 
miracles is that using a formula like Bayes' theorem, centered 
around the idea of conditional probability, is an appropriate 
way to measure the reliability of testimony and the probability 
of a miracle (or any other event) occurring. While on different 
sides of the debate as to whether Hume was correct,  Owen 
and Holder both agree that interpreting Hume in a Bayesian 
manner is appropriate, and that using prior probabilities in as-
sessing the likelihood of a particular occurrence is a valid ap-
proach. However, there are some who have questioned the 
logic of using prior probabilities in assessing the reliability of 
witness testimony. In this next section, the thoughts of Richard 
Price, an eighteenth century mathematician, and David Cohen, 
a twentieth century philosopher, will be explored. Both Cohen 
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and Price offer arguments as to why this probabilistic reason-
ing is an inappropriate way to measure things such as witness 
reliability. Furthermore, Cohen and Price show how this topic 
has implications far beyond the field of miracles, affecting 
things such as the reliability of a courtroom witness to the re-
liability of medical tests for diseases. Finally, we will examine 
the objections brought by Sobel, who argues that there are 
some limitations to Bayes' theorem, and provides examples 
where our intuition may show Bayes' theorem to not be en-
tirely reasonable. 
 Sobel quotes Price as saying that, "the turning point in 
Mr. Hume's argument is... the principle, that no testimony 
should engage our belief, except the improbability in the false-
hood of it is greater than that in the event which it attests... he 
[Price] maintains 'that improbabilities as such do not lessen the 
capacity of testimony to report truth."10 Price provides a num-
ber of examples to show his case. His cases can generally be 
characterized as examples that appeal to our intuition, where 
we might be led to believe a trustworthy source despite the fact 
that there are long odds that the event being reported would 
actually occur. For example, Price provides the example of a 
newspaper that is generally accurate two out of every three 
times. This newspaper one day "reported the loss of a ferry 
boat during a crossing it had previously made safely two thou-
sand times. In this case, Price asserts, "testimony that is accu-
rate only two out of three times would overcome odds of thou-
sands to one against."11 In addition, Price offers another reason 
                                                
10 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 177, quoting Richard 
Price's 4th dissertation.  
11 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 194.  
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that prior probabilities should not usually be relevant. Owen 
attempts to sympathetically give the case for Price's second 
argument as follows: "One could argue that the likelihood of 
the event reported, or the distribution of past occurrences or 
non-occurrences, is independent of the accuracy of the testi-
mony, so that when we are to consider whether or not to be-
lieve testimony, only its accuracy should be taken into ac-
count."12 
 Owen also examines the arguments of a more recent 
philosopher, L.J. Cohen. Cohen comes to similar conclusions 
that Price does, but along a slightly different vein. Cohen will 
accept the use of prior probabilities and conditional statements 
when discussing the case of long term frequencies of a certain 
event, just like Hume. But if the concern is with the likelihood 
of one particular instance of an event occurring, the prior prob-
abilities should be ignored.13 This has some quite practical im-
plications. Say one is experiencing health symptoms indicat-
ing that he or she has either disease A or B.14 For every 20 
people experiencing symptoms, 19 have A and 1 has B. We 
also know that the test is 80% accurate. Cohen might want to 
point out that if one was to use Bayes' theorem the probability 
                                                
 Another example with the same newspaper is given, where 9 
highly improbable events occur. Price alleges that Hume's probabil-
istic reasoning would lead us to believe none, despite the fact that 
with 9 events and a fairly accurate newspaper, it seems reasonable 
to think that we ought to believe some of them! 
12 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 195. Owen claims that Price's 
original argument does not mount much of a challenge to Hume, 
and so reformulates it in a way that provides a stronger attack 
against Hume's position. 
13 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 196.  
14 See Cohen describe this example on p. 196-198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furman Humanities Review 
 48 
that one actually has disease B, given that a B test result is 
provided, is only 17.39%.15 
 
 
 
 ! ℎ4?6	2076476	O H>7050?6	O	5675 = .QR∗.RS.QR∗.RS*.TS∗.UR = 17.39% 
 
If it is true that given a positive B test, there is only a 17.39% 
chance of actually having the B disease, then many might turn 
to wonder and ask, what is the point of taking the test at all?
 But if we ignored the prior probabilities when as-
sessing the chance that one particular individual has the dis-
ease, then we might decide to trust the results of the test. Owen 
describes how this is not simply a matter of academic debate, 
but has important applications: "suppose that the likelihood of 
a nuclear attack is one in a thousand, but that the accuracy of 
one's radar or other early warning devices is only about 99.8%. 
Would it be rational to act on the information given by one's 
equipment, or more rational not to set up such warning devices 
at all?"16 
 Owen's response to Price and Cohen's objections cen-
ters around the need for specificity of language. Recall the 
medical test, where the test is accurate 80% of the time. What 
does 80% of the time mean? If it means that looking at the 
subset of the population who have disease B, the test is correct 
80% of the time, then we will get the surprising result above, 
where even if one tests positive for disease B, using Bayes' 
                                                
15 How we interpret the statement "accurate 80% of the time" really 
affects how this is calculated. This will be explored in the next sec-
tion on precision of language. Also, this is meant purely as a hypo-
thetical example, and is not an attempt to say that medical tests for 
diseases are not accurate enough to be worth taking.  
16 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 197. 
(Eq. 7) 
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theorem it would not make sense to trust the results of the test. 
But, what if 80% accuracy meant that if one tested positive for 
disease B, one had an 80% chance of actually having disease 
B? Well this would drastically change one's thinking, and if an 
individual tested positive for disease B, it would be quite log-
ical to trust the results of the test! Where Cohen has confused 
his readers with his disease example is that he has been am-
biguous with language that could cause one to mistake the 
value for the !(ℎ4?6	O|5675	H>7050?6	:><	O) conditional 
with the !(5675	H>7050?6	:><	O|ℎ4?6	O). What we are look-
ing for in the final answer is former, but the example presents 
the 80% as if it should be final answer intuitively, and then 
uses the .8 figure as the latter probability in erroneously calcu-
lating Bayes' Theorem. Owen provides sufficient explanations 
to the rest of Price and Cohen's objections, which center 
around the same idea of ambiguous language. Owen is not 
providing a math lesson here: rather, the point to be made is 
linguistic. When using variations of the terms credible, relia-
ble, and accurate, we must be acutely aware of and careful to 
define what those terms mean. A lack of specificity of lan-
guage here creates the confusion highlighted in our previous 
examples. 
 Another interesting possible objection made against 
Hume/Bayesian probabilities comes from Sobel. in his reac-
tion to the important work of Tversky and Kahneman.17 
Tversky and Kahneman give an experiment where they tell the 
following story: 85 taxicabs in a town are green, and the other 
15 are blue. One taxicab is in an accident at night, where a 
witness, who can correctly identify the color 80% of the time, 
has identified the taxicab as blue. Kahneman and Tversky ask 
their subjects, what is the probability that the taxicab in the 
                                                
17 he is specifically citing their 1977 work, "Casual Thinking in 
Judgment under Uncertainty." Tversky and Kahneman here say that 
there taxicab experiments imply that people are irrational in their 
decision making. Sobel provides another possible way to tell the 
story of the results of their experiments. 
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accident was blue? The median response in their experiment 
was that there is an 80% chance that the cab is blue. Respond-
ents to this scenario had no intuitive idea of Bayes' Theorem 
and conditional probability, and "when updating initial proba-
bilities for the taxicab's being blue, these subjects in fact ig-
nored them and set them aside."18 If the experiment ended 
here, it would be no more than a real life example of an exper-
iment almost identical to the hypotheticals concerning news-
papers and disease testing above. But, Tversky and Kahneman 
take things one step farther: they do the exact same experi-
ment, except instead of telling respondents that 85% of cabs 
are green and 15% are blue, they say that 85% of cabs involved 
in accidents are green and 15% of cabs involved in accidents 
are blue, providing no information as to the general percentage 
of taxicabs in the city. Given the same question as before, 
these subjects respond much differently than those told about 
the general ratio of taxicabs, as the median response is that 
there is a 55% chance that the taxicab was actually blue. In 
either scenario, if the subjects had responded by using Bayes' 
theorem, all would have answered 41%, which is much closer 
to the answer given by the second group of respondents. The 
typical response to this experiment might be that it shows how 
people's intuition is irrational and does not line up with the 
math. But, another explanation is that the Bayesian formula-
tion we have been using might not be as robust as originally 
thought. In this experiment, which is a stronger piece of evi-
dence that the specific taxicab in the accident might not actu-
ally be blue: 85% of cabs in the city are green, or 85% of cabs 
involved in accidents in the city are green? The latter, as it 
provides an additional piece of relevant information. If we 
only knew the former, and were then asked the expected ratio 
of blue to green cabs in accidents, 41% would be the correct 
                                                
18 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 182. 
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answer. But the actual ratio in question will have some varia-
tion from our expected value. This means that using Bayes' 
theorem to find the results in both scenarios will lead to an 
accurate answer, in that in both scenarios the calculations will 
have been done correctly in accordance with the data given. 
Where these two scenarios differ is in their precision: scenario 
two has more detailed information and therefore we should 
have a higher level of confidence in them. To put another way, 
both Bayesian formulations give us a 41% chance that the cab 
is actually blue, but we can trust the 41% figure in scenario 
two more than we can trust the 41% figure in scenario one. 
Note also that in both scenarios, we did not change the relia-
bility of the witness to the crash: the variance in confidence 
we have in our answer is so far due to completely to the dif-
ference in the quality of other prior evidence. 
 Sobel has a similar argument here. In his assessment 
that normal Bayesian probabilities may not always accurately 
reflect the situation at hand, he imagines how a perfectly ra-
tional being who is limited in data and capacities but logically 
omniscient in that he or she is quite certain of every logical 
necessity might assess the total credence-state of a particular 
problem.19 "The main thing to say is that it might be better 
represented by a many-membered set of probability functions 
than by any single probability functions."20 A Bayesian prob-
ability function might be a member of this set of functions, but 
not the only one used. These functions would then be com-
bined into  singular probabilities, which would be a sort of 
weighted average based on the accuracy and precision of the 
data available. These singular probabilities could be described 
by their quantities and qualities. The quantities are easy 
                                                
19 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 183. 
20 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 183. 
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enough to describe, as the end results from the calculation, for 
the example the 41% probability derived previously. Qualities, 
"would correspond to what some might term the 'weights' or 
'degrees of ambiguity' of evidential bases for propositions, and 
to the confidence a person had in his various 'singular proba-
bilities', displayed perhaps in his readiness to accept bets based 
on them."21 In Tversky and Kahneman's example, I am more 
likely to place bets based on the second scenario rather than 
the first, despite the fact that both Bayesian probabilities are 
the same.  
 What conclusions can we draw from these objections 
to Hume and Bayesian probabilistic thinking? We can cer-
tainly see that we must certainly be careful in our language, 
and that terms such as reliability, credibility, and accuracy can 
mean different things depending on their context. In Owen's 
example, if a test is advertised as 80% accurate, does that mean 
that considering those who have the disease the "test is right 
80% of the time," or does it mean that considering those whom 
the test indicates as having the disease, "it is right 80% of the 
time?"22 As we have seen, these two statements mean drasti-
cally different things. By following Owen's lead, recognizing 
and clearing up some of the ambiguity in our language, it is 
fair to say that Price and Cohen's main objections to Hume and 
Bayes can be accounted for. While being more careful in our 
language can alleviate us from the objections of Price and Co-
hen, Sobel's critique is more interesting. Sobel does not claim 
that Bayesian statistics provide wrong or inaccurate results to 
a situation at hand; rather, he illustrates that Bayes' Theorem, 
                                                
21 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony 
 for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analy-
sis." The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 184. 
22 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 198. 
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while a good tool to use, is limited in its ability to assess the 
quality23 of the evidence at hand. 
   
Revisiting Miracles in Light of Sobel's Objection 
 
 Earlier, I concluded that given Holder and Owen's 
work interpreting Hume's statements on miracles in ways con-
sistent with Bayes' theorem, Hume misses the mark on deny-
ing the existence of miracles based on probabilities, and that 
there could be cases where it may be reasonable to believe that 
a miracle has occurred. And while Sobel's argument using just 
Bayes' theorem is nearly identical and reaches the same con-
clusion as Owen, Sobel's argument that Bayes' theorem may 
not be all we need to look at when considering evidence of 
prior probabilities could be a strong counter to Holder and is 
essential to this discussion. When Sobel applies his additional 
argument to the miracle situation, he claims that that an indi-
vidual's singular priors for and against miracles will be of the 
highest qualities. As he says, "probabilities averaged of such 
miracles, given their unambiguous inconsistency with what 
one takes to be the natural and necessary order of nature, will 
be concentrated closely around the average value."24 Sobel is 
saying that the argument against miracles is like the second 
taxicab scenario, in that the quality of evidence (related to the 
prior probability that miracles are highly improbable) is ex-
tremely high. He claims that, "it is not that probabilities for 
miracles are apt to be of extraordinarily low and infinitesimal 
                                                
23 As Jordan Howard Sobel defines it, described previously in rela-
tion to confidence levels or the precision of the data at hand. 
24 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 184. 
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quantities, but that they are apt to be extraordinarily 'concen-
trated' and 'focused', and of highest quality."25 This last state-
ment summarizes the key assumption in Sobel's argument. He 
does believe that the probability of a miracle is low; but his 
primary argument here is that one should have a high degree 
of confidence in this low probability. 
 Sobel's arguments about confidence levels in prior 
probabilities are not specifically addressed by Holder. How-
ever interestingly enough, Holder does provide different ex-
amples of scenarios where we may be able to have more con-
fidence in support of a result that provides evidence for the 
reasonability of a miracle. Holder's additional arguments cen-
ter around the difference between individual and multiple in-
dependent testimony. It is intuitive that if there were two peo-
ple who independently testified to the occurrence of event M, 
then to use Sobel's terms both the quantity and quality of the 
resulting probability would be higher. The higher quality of 
this singular probability can be explained as being akin to a 
larger sample size in a poll. Having a poll with 500 people is 
going to create a result that has lower variance than a poll 
showing the same result but with only 100 people. Both 
Holder and Sobel's additional arguments, beyond the basics of 
explaining Bayes' theorem, center around the quality of the ev-
idence and the confidence level one would apply to the final 
probability. Unfortunately, their arguments here sidestep each 
other. One could perhaps rebut Sobel, claiming that he is mak-
ing a huge assumption about the extremely high quality of a 
singular prior of a miracle occurring. Sobel does not give 
much justification for this assumption, other than saying that 
we all know that miracles do not occur, therefore the quality 
of our prior evidence against miracles is high. But in a discus-
sion where Sobel's conclusion is that belief in a miracle is not 
reasonable, it would seem circular to suggest that the evidence 
                                                
25 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 185. 
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for this is that we know miracles do not occur.  On the other 
side, one could take issue with Holder by claiming that he cre-
ates a very neat and clean world in order to perform his math-
ematical analysis. For example, Holder assumes a highly reli-
able and trustworthy witness; how do we know if this 
condition is fulfilled in the real world? Furthermore, Holder 
assumes independent multiple testimony; it is an open ques-
tion how often this condition could actually be fulfilled. All in 
all, my earlier assertion that given Hume's formulation, we 
should disagree with him and leave open the option that there 
could be cases where we could reasonably believe in the ex-
istence of a miracle, still holds weight given these additional 
arguments. However, the further arguments of multiple inde-
pendent testimony and the quality of singular priors present 
quite a challenging situation to analyze. Needless to say, there 
is much room for further research and analysis on these two 
advancements of the argument beyond the basic Bayesian for-
mula.         
 
Probabilistic Language in Biblical Studies 
 
 So far, we have examined David Hume's probabilistic 
argument against the existence of miracles, and responses 
from modern day mathematicians and philosophers on both 
sides who use Bayes' theorem as the foundation for their argu-
ment in support of or against Hume. Overall, Holder's argu-
ment using Bayes' theorem is convincing, and should be seen 
as strong evidence that there could be cases where belief in the 
occurrence of a miracle is rational. However, given Sobel and 
Holder's arguments that go beyond the scope of the basic 
Bayesian formulation, the waters become muddied, and I have 
no tidy conclusion to offer. But, the purpose of this paper is 
not to prove Hume right or wrong; rather, it is to use the debate 
around Hume's argument as a case study for how scholars 
across disciplines integrate mathematical language and con-
cepts into arguments that may at first glance seem to have 
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nothing to do with math at all. If convinced of this, a few ques-
tions no doubt arise. First, why do scholars use this sort of lan-
guage? Second, is probabilistic or mathematical reasoning an 
appropriate way to evaluate truth claims in the humanities? In 
the natural sciences the scientific method and statistical eval-
uation certainly dominate in the quest for truth. (although I 
would argue the conclusions drawn from the data involve a 
certain amount of storytelling as well) So is expressing argu-
ments couched in probabilities and conditionals the humani-
ties version of the scientific method? And finally, do scholars' 
probabilistic statements make sense when expressed mathe-
matically? In this concluding section, I will zoom in on the 
field of biblical studies, to provide some examples of this sort 
of language being used and analyze the role it plays in devel-
oping arguments. 
 In discussing how biblical historians assess the histor-
ical truth of events in the bible, Bart Ehrman states that, "His-
torians more or less rank past events on the basis of the relative 
probability that they occurred. All that historians can do is 
show what probably happened in the past."26 N.T. Wright sees 
the biblical historian as one who is, "looking... at evidence 
about the past, trying to reconstruct the probable course of 
events... defending such reconstructions.... on the scientific 
grounds of getting in the data, doing so with appropriate sim-
plicity, and shedding light on other areas of research."27 Mar-
cus Borg discusses how empirical verification has become a 
staple of the modern worldview, forcing one to reduce truth, 
"to factuality, either scientifically verifiable or historically re-
liable facts."28 Ernst Renan, arguing that the lack of modern 
day miracles should cause great doubt that biblical miracles 
                                                
26 Bart Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted: (New York, NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers,  2009), 175. 
27 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 17. 
28 Ibid., 10. 
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occurred states that, "If it is proved that no contemporary mir-
acle will bear inquiry, is it not probable that the miracles of the 
past... would equally present their share of illusion, if it were 
possible to criticise them in detail?"29 As we can see from a 
brief survey of prominent biblical historians, the common her-
meneutic in analyzing texts and their historical truth claims is 
to gather data, see what is verifiable, and then to express what 
is probable, possible, or unlikely to have occurred. This is ex-
actly what the Jesus Seminar of the 1980s and 1990s set out to 
do, organizing Jesus' statements by whether they believed Je-
sus said something like what was written down, probably said 
what was written, did not say what was written but contains 
his ideas, or did not say the passage and the passage does not 
come from Jesus' tradition. Biblical historians follow this ap-
proach because we are captives of this worldview, as Borg 
says, "like all worldviews, it functions in our minds almost un-
consciously, affecting what we think possible and what we pay 
attention to."30  
 While not outright rejecting the use the of probabilis-
tic reasoning and empirical verification to assess the veracity 
of biblical truth claims, Borg does claim that this approach 
should certainly not be the exclusive way of assessing the truth 
of the bible. As he states, "I realized that there are well-authen-
ticated experiences that radically transcend what the modern 
worldview can accommodate. I became aware that the modern 
worldview is itself a cultural construction, the product of a par-
ticular era in human intellectual history."31 This is evident in 
his explanation of the truth of the post-Easter Jesus: 
  
the truth of Easter itself, does not depending upon 
their [Easter stories] being literally and historically 
                                                
29 Ernest Renan, The Life of Jesus (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1991), 22. 
30 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 10. 
31 Ibid., 11. 
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factual. For me, the historical ground of Easter is very 
simple: the followers of Jesus, both then and now, 
continued to experience Jesus as a living reality after 
his death... Those experiences have taken a variety of 
forms. They include dramatic forms such as visions 
and mystical experiences, and less dramatic forms 
such as a sense of the presence of Jesus... The truth of 
Easter is grounded in these experiences, not in what 
happened (or didn't happen) on a particular Sunday al-
most two thousand years ago.32 
 
Borg believes that this truth about Easter can be verified 
through different people's experiences, but not through some 
historical or scientific verification. He does not necessarily be-
lieve in the physical resurrection of Jesus, but still accepts that 
dramatic visions or mystical experiences of Jesus are an ex-
pression of the truth: "I think visions and apparitions can be 
true, by which I mean truthful disclosures of the way things 
are. I do not put them in the category of hallucinations."33 I 
agree with Borg that these are experiences that could not be 
empirically verified with our five senses, or as Borg says, 
would not be caught on a video camera.34 But Borg delineates 
between visions, which are truthful disclosures of the way 
things are, and hallucinations, which are not truthful disclo-
sures of the way things are. So while he initially may seem to 
avoid issues of historical accuracy, and thus his arguments 
would not able to be evaluated by something like Bayes' theo-
rem, he still must discern between whether a particular expe-
rience is a vision or hallucination. By making this distinguish-
ment, Borg opens the door for questioning the validity of 
someone's experience. How should we question the validity of 
                                                
32 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 135. 
33 Ibid., 133. 
34 Ibid., 132. 
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someone's experience? Do we assess the credibility of the in-
dividual who had the experience, and see whether the truth ex-
perienced lines up with other evidence we have? See how this 
is no different than what we did in the case study about Hume 
and miracles. So while Borg successfully posits that certain 
experiences cannot be evaluated through the five senses (or 
cannot be seen by a video camera), he is still in a sense stuck 
in the modern worldview by having to distinguish between the 
truth of certain dramatic experiences. 
 If we are still left in a situation where there must be 
some way to analyze the truthfulness of certain experiences or 
events in the bible, what should that standard be? In suggesting 
how we can see if it is possible that Jesus could have raised an 
individual from the dead (or been himself physically resur-
rected), Renan posits that a modern day thaumaturgus would 
need to prove that resurrection is indeed possible, and the 
power is to resurrect is vested within certain individuals: 
  
A commission... would be named. This commission 
would choose a corpse, would assure itself that the 
death was real... If, under such conditions, the resur-
rection were effected, a probability almost equal to 
certainty would be established. As, however, it ought 
to be possible always to repeat an experiment... the 
thaumaturgus would be invited to reproduce his mar-
velous act under other circumstances.35 
 
For all the modern day thaumaturgi reading this, (after all, you 
are my target audience) the bar has not been set low. Wright 
describes this sort of approach to verifying biblical stories: "It 
is proposed that the way to study Jesus is to break the material 
                                                
35 Ernest Renan, The Life of Jesus (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1991), 22. 
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down into its component parts and to evaluate these on the ba-
sis of certain rules."36 In this case the relevant parts are resur-
rection stories, and the rule is, can resurrections be proved via 
the scientific method? Wright offers a different method that he 
still describes as, "the scientific method of hypothesis and ver-
ification,"37 but yet looks nothing like what Renan describes 
above.  
The researcher, after a period of total and sometimes 
confusing immersion in the data, emerges with a hy-
pothesis, a big picture of how everything fits to-
gether... it is tested against three criteria: Does it make 
sense of the data as they stand? Does it have an appro-
priate level of simplicity, or even elegance? Does it 
shed light on areas of research other than the one it 
was designed to cover?38 
 
Wright notes that within biblical studies there is no universally 
agreed upon way to decide what gets to count as appropriate 
answers and evidence for these questions. This is certainly the 
subject of much debate. For the purpose of this paper, see how 
the answers to Wright's first question in particular invite the 
sorts of probabilistic language used in the discussion of Hume 
and miracles. As Wright notes, the data does not always pre-
sent a coherent picture.39 So pieces of data must be weighed 
against one another. This comes to light when the biblical his-
torian tries to piece together the relationship between the four 
gospels: when was each written, which gospel copied from 
which other gospel, and what other sources were used? Wright 
describes how  
 
                                                
36 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 23. 
37 Ibid., 22. 
38 Ibid.,, 22. 
39 Ibid., 20. 
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Mutually incompatible theories abound as to where, 
when, and why the synoptic gospels came to final 
form. Since there is no agreement about sources, there 
is no agreement as to how and why the different evan-
gelists used them. If, for instance, we believe that Mat-
thew used Mark, we can discuss Matthew's theology 
on the basis of his editing of Mark. If we don't believe 
Matthew used Mark, we can't.40   
 
These arguments quickly become about if-then statements, or 
probabilities of occurrence: regardless of whether of one's def-
inition of a scientific method for historical analysis lines up 
with Renan or Wright, logical and mathematical reasoning be-
comes crucial in order to understand the arguments at hand.     
 From this survey of important biblical historians and 
scholars, we can conclude that mathematical language and 
probabilistic reasoning have an important role to play in ascer-
taining the truth, however one wishes to define it, of biblical 
narratives. Biblical historians' work is replete with argumen-
tation that utilizes probabilistic reasoning, and is thus able to 
be analyzed through techniques such as Bayes' theorem. This 
means that to be able to assess the quality of arguments of phi-
losophers, theologians, and historians, a degree of mathemati-
cal literacy may be required. I will now conclude with a story 
of how a bit of mathematical intuition may be helpful beyond 
the realm of biblical studies and miracles. Consider the story 
of Stanislav Petrov, former officer in the Soviet Air Defense 
Force, known as "the man who saved the world" from nuclear 
war in 1983. Petrov was in charge of monitoring the Soviet 
satellites that were supposed to tell the Air Defense Force 
when an American ballistic missile was in the air. At this time 
the Soviet Union was on high alert, as they had recently shot 
down a civilian airliner, killing 269 people on board, including 
62 Americans (among them was a sitting U.S. congressman). 
                                                
40 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 21. 
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Fearing retaliation, one day Petrov's radar screen showed five 
missiles had been launched by the U.S. towards the Soviet Un-
ion. Petrov claimed he had a "gut instinct,"41 that this was a 
false alarm. Petrov noted that it would be odd for the U.S. to 
launch a strike, but to only send five missiles, instead of send-
ing a salvo of hundreds. And while the satellites were certainly 
set up to prevent a false alarm, Petrov recognized that there 
was still the possibility for failure. Needing to make a decision 
fast, Petrov decided to not inform his superiors that missiles 
were on the way; only when sufficient time had passed and no 
missiles hit the Soviet Union did Petrov know he had made the 
right call. While Petrov most certainly was not frantically 
scribbling out Bayes' Theorem, his intuition lines up with the 
mathematical logic of conditional probability. Petrov's prior 
knowledge was that the chance that the U.S. would launch a 
strike was low, and if they did, they would most likely launch 
hundreds of missiles at once, not five. Petrov then had to up-
date his knowledge based on new information: he saw five 
missiles on his radar. The question, expressed using Bayesian 
conditional probabilities: what is the probability the Ameri-
cans are beginning a missile attack on the Soviet Union, given 
that the radar is showing five missiles coming towards the So-
viet Union on the screen? This is the same question that Hume 
asks, only instead of in the realm of miracles, it was in the 
realm of nuclear defense. Given this, perhaps Thomas Bayes 
should also get the moniker, the man who saved the world? 
  
                                                
41 Marc Bennetts, "Soviet Officer who Averted Cold War Nuclear 
disaster dies aged 77," The Guardian, September 18, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/18/soviet-officer-
who-averted-cold-war-nuclear-disaster-dies-aged-77  
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE REVOLUTION 
IN THE CENTENNIAL AND BICENTENNIAL 
ERAS:  
“THE INEVITABLE PROGRESS  
OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT?” 
  
Anna Doremus 
 
The early years of the United States are often 
shrouded in a heroic mythology—the names of George Wash-
ington, Thomas Jefferson, and King George III populate a 
story that is collectively considered to be one of a hearty and 
ideological people rising up in unison against a merciless, ty-
rannical empire.  Redcoats, flags, and cannons are envisioned 
in this romantic ideal of our nation’s birth.  This heroic Amer-
ican pageant was deliberately fashioned by Centennial histori-
ans like George Bancroft.  At the time of the 1876 Centennial, 
American values of patriotism and national pride were being 
cemented, and the historians of that era played their part in 
defending the honor of the American people.  A century later, 
at the Bicentennial of the nation’s founding, there were fewer 
grand notions of patriotism.  Criticism and internationalism 
began to play a larger role in the historiography; these later 
historians realized that, perhaps, there had been fewer fire-
works, greater injustices, and a greater dependence on Europe 
than traditional historians preferred to remember.  Centennial 
historians wrote glorious patriotic tales of war, great men, and 
the American indomitable spirit; Bicentennial historians pre-
ferred more discussion of social history, constitutional ideol-
ogy, and international factors.1  
                                                
1 Histories being considered as Centennial history or Bicentennial 
history for this paper were published within 15 years surrounding 
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 A study of key movements and specific historians in 
the field of American history can show the interesting transi-
tion from nationalist glorification to scrutinizing analysis.  
Particularly influential in the Centennial era was the immense 
narrative of George Bancroft, his History of the United States, 
emerged as the definitive and patriotic account of the early 
American years.  Magazines such as The Pennsylvania Maga-
zine of History and Biography followed the thematic path 
forged by Bancroft in patriotic works that used histories to cre-
ate an estimation for certain smaller communities or people.  
These authors and their works propagated a progressive and 
Whiggish understanding of the United States and are therefore 
worthy of further study.  By the time of the Bicentennial, a 
new crop of prominent authors were focusing on dramatically 
different themes—there was an “air of detachment, a sense of 
balance, in which conventional nationalism is less in evidence 
than was the case in a centennial observance.”2  Historians 
such as Richard B. Morris and Lawrence S. Kaplan showed 
the changing role of American history as their works were 
characterized by national criticism, sharp analysis, and a dis-
appearing sense of the divine providence of the American peo-
ple.  The study of authors from both periods reflects how 
changing popular thought affects historiography. 
 Historiography around the time of the American Cen-
tennial was marked by an intense desire to preserve honor.  
George Bancroft sought to cement every detail of the Revolu-
tion in ten definitive tomes on the battles, the nature of the 
Patriots, and the character of the nation as a whole.  His work 
was in fact laden with nationalist and Whiggish rhetoric that 
                                                
either date— there are obvious exceptions, the contributions of 
which must be studied due to their effect on the thought of that era, 
even if their dates of publication are not strictly within the general 
parameters. 
2 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The American Revolution in an Interna-
tional Perspective: Views from Bicentennial Symposia,” The Inter-
national History Review, Vol. 1, no.3 (July, 1979), 426. 
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would continue to appear in subsequent histories of this era.  
Historians also wanted to declare the accomplishments of their 
town, state, family, or ethnic community.  These years when 
the standard history of the American Revolution was being es-
tablished were critical, and it was very important to establish 
one’s connections to the heroism of the patriot cause.  More 
than any other common thread, the histories published in the 
late nineteenth century were characterized by a profound wish 
to glorify patriotism and reinforce a nationalist ideal of the 
American people and their revolution. 
  Inaugurating the early tradition of narrative history, 
Bancroft’s History of the United States “helped to establish the 
framework within which we see our early history.”3  Ten vol-
umes published in the years surrounding the Centennial study 
the history of the American colonies from the mid-1500s 
though the 1780s.  He wrote with the intention of telling a 
story of progress and fomenting the idea that “some exalted 
destiny awaited America at the end.”4  The idea of a complete 
narrative history coupled neatly with Bancroft’s Whiggish no-
tions of America’s divinely ordained linear progress and of the 
American man as the most perfect man.  Bancroft believed that 
the “American experience demonstrated the inevitable pro-
gress of the human spirit” which he conveyed through the con-
struction of “a narrative action, a plot with a beginning, mid-
dle, and end.”5  This style glibly praised the positive aspects 
of the American Revolution and glossed over some more con-
troversial aspects to better reinforce the idea of the singular 
American narrative. 
 More notable than his narrative style was his patriotic 
tone—it was this combination that made him the historical 
standard for Centennial-era historiography.  Writing with an 
                                                
3 Robert H. Canary, George Bancroft, (New York: Twayne Pub-
lishers, Inc.), i. 
4 Canary, George Bancroft, 20.  
5 Ibid., 49. 
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unreserved love of country, Bancroft cemented ideas of Amer-
ican exceptionalism and glory.  At the commencement of his 
romantic and somewhat poetic tale, he wrote 
 
The hour of the American Revolution was come. The 
people of the continent with irresistible energy 
obeyed one general impulse, as the earth in spring 
listens to the command of nature, and without the ap-
pearance of effort bursts forth in life in perfect har-
mony.6 
 
This idea of an ideological current pushing the people towards 
the Revolution was a favorable one as it supported the early 
conceptualization of “manifest destiny.”  Even choosing to 
deemphasize American diplomacy, he wrote that the colonies’ 
European allies became such as a result of “the movement of 
intellectual freedom.”7  Bancroft’s overwhelming love of 
country detracted from the credibility of his work.  However, 
his History, was still an incredibly influential work which bol-
stered the idea of American Centennial historiography as a 
fundamentally patriotic field. 
 Following logically from the idea of the great Ameri-
can story was the idea of history replete with patriotic and ad-
miring tones in order to better encourage a sense of national 
pride. This was exhibited in the staunch defense of the Amer-
ican colonies and their proud stock in an 1889 piece by Charles 
Stillé, refuting the idea of American colonies as penal settle-
ments.  Australia, a fellow British colony, had been populated 
largely by criminal exiles, and naturally rumors began to cir-
culate about the character of the American colonists as well.  
The notion that the American colonies were influenced by the 
                                                
6 George Bancroft, History of the United States of America, from 
the discovery of the American continent. Vol. 7, 1875. (Reprint: 
University of Michigan: Making of America Digital Library, 2007), 
21. 
7 Bancroft, History of the United States of America, Vol. 9, 499. 
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number of criminals among them was repugnant to Stillé.  He 
rejected any argument that the American identity was one 
shaped by lawless exiles.  Obviously affronted, Stillé re-
marked that it was “strange and novel to a student of American 
history” to hear writers claim that “the race which people the 
American colonies was infected with the same ineradicable 
taint of crime and villany [sic]” as the criminal population in 
Australia, a true penal settlement.  Essentially crying out 
against defamation of the American character, Stillé defended 
the idea of the noble American spirit—the spirit that was re-
sponsible for their victory in the Revolution.  This spirit was a 
common cord among a disparate American people, and histo-
rians of this era actively sought to emphasize this particular 
cord.  He declared the claim utterly nonsensical and found the 
unnamed English writers’ “ignorance on this subject as great 
and as invincible as ever.”8 
 There was a sense of local and not just national honor 
as well, and, because of the Quaker religious beliefs, many 
Americans outside of Pennsylvania did not consider Pennsyl-
vanians to be true patriots.  As a result, a plethora of works 
emerged defending their participation in the Revolution.  Dur-
ing the period leading to and at the time “when the Declaration 
of Independence was adopted, there was a large party in Penn-
sylvania, led by some of its most distinguished public men, 
who thought the time decided upon for that purpose prema-
ture.”9  However, this 1890 publication in The Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography went on to detail the im-
portance and truly American nature of dissension.  Men of 
considerable influence such as John Dickinson, James Wilson, 
and Robert Morris were to be hailed as patriotic even in their 
                                                
8 Charles Stillé, “ American Colonies as Penal Settlements,” The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 12, no. 4, 
(1889), 458. 
9 Charles J. Stillé, “Pennsylvania and the Declaration of Independ-
ence,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 
12, no.4 (1890), 385. 
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objection to separation in July of 1776 because they held their 
country’s best interests in their hearts.  Charles Stillé wrote 
that, lamentably, “approval of the Declaration of Independ-
ence nowadays is the sole test of patriotism, and very little 
heed is given to the earnestness of their opinions or the energy 
of their conduct during the war, either before or after that 
event.”10  Ostentatious and conventional patriotism was of the 
utmost importance to the reputations of states and men, so the 
nuanced position of many prominent Pennsylvanians during 
the founding was heavily discussed.  Men like Dickinson were 
defended at length.11  Ultimately, Stillé wanted recognition 
that  
 
America has produced no class of citizens whose ca-
reer during the Revolution was more constant in its 
loyalty or more full of devoted service of all kinds to 
the country than those much-abused men who de-
fended to the last the chartered rights of Pennsylva-
nia.12 
 
Here it was readily apparent that there was a desire to defend 
the honor of one’s fellow countrymen by ensuring that they 
were in fact patriotic if unique in their opinions.  Patriotism 
was an essential quality of good and honorable men in Amer-
ica in 1876. 
 Continuing in the trend of histories preserving local 
honor and memory, Duffield Osborne’s 1887 article on Irish 
participation in the war provides a rather incendiary argument 
against the Irish.  Osborne’s piece was used to attack a small, 
locally-known group instead of promoting one—he believed 
that the Irish in Boston gave themselves far too much credit 
                                                
10 Ibid., 390. 
11 Charles Thomson, “Early Days of the Revolution in Philadel-
phia,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 
2, no. 4 (1878), 411. 
12 Stillé, “Pennsylvania,” 429. 
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for Ireland’s efforts in the war.  He cited a wide cultural “mis-
apprehension that the Irish were of any great and special ser-
vice to this republic of ours, in the days of the Revolution.”13  
Although anti-Irish undertones were apparent in his piece, his 
claim was that undue gratitude to the Irish was impeding upon 
the gratitude reserved for the true American allies, the 
French.14   
 This interest in a topic of a specialized and detailed 
nature was replicated in George Inman’s 1883 firsthand ac-
count of his experiences in the Revolution—which was essen-
tially the unedited publication of a diary kept by Inman during 
the war years.  The content of this diary contained no ground-
breaking historiographic text—its relevance instead came 
from the mere fact of its publication.  This diary, published in 
The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 
demonstrated the historical and societal interest in firsthand 
narratives of the war.  His work was peppered with patriotic 
sentiments and closed with “God’s name be praised,” reflect-
ing the patriotic and religious sentiment in which many aca-
demic works were immersed.15  These smaller accounts 
showed an interest in the histories of certain towns, men, and 
ancestries—this tradition is present in historical works of to-
day but often with more analytical tones and broader refer-
ences to supplement the narratives.  
 Works of history published at the time of the Centen-
nial were fewer in number but not smaller in power than later 
works.  Historians, especially Bancroft, used their relatively 
early appearance in the field of American history to inundate 
our field with notions of progress, patriotism, and honor.  The 
existence of both personal histories and grand narratives came 
                                                
13 Duffield Osborne, “Irish Aid in the American Revolution,” The 
North American Review, Vol. 145, no. 386 (1887),  97. 
14 Ibid., 99. 
15 George Inman, “George Inman’s Narrative of the American Rev-
olution,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 
Vol. 7, no. 3 (1883), 248. 
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from a singular desire to protect the honor of a people and of 
a nation.  Centennial histories lacked a depth of analysis that 
later became critical at the time of the Bicentennial.  This was 
due in part to History in 1876 being a comparatively unsophis-
ticated field and to the then-limited access to primary docu-
ments and others’ work.  The need to tell an engaging and pat-
riotic story of their honorable American ancestors usurped any 
desire to examine the colonies’ cause with criticism or skepti-
cism. 
 The flurry of publications at the time of the Bicenten-
nial was more critical and of a decidedly different nature than 
the comparatively primitive efforts of Centennial historians.  
Historians like Richard B. Morris, Joan Hoff-Wilson, Jona-
than Dull, and Lawrence S. Kaplan produced histories with 
more specialized and analytical natures—examining aspects 
of the Revolution such as social history and women’s rights, 
the legal nature of the Constitution, and international diplo-
macy.  No longer was history of the all-encompassing narra-
tive sort popular; historians delved into lesser-studied ele-
ments and themes during the Bicentennial era.  Characterized 
by a shift from patriotic intentions to motives of curiosity and 
then by a more confident desire for self-examination, these 
historians produced more social and political histories discuss-
ing the Revolutionary period not simply as a line of dates, doc-
uments, and men.  Bicentennial historians showed an interest 
in histories of marginalized people, constitutional and legal 
histories, and diplomatic histories.  These new themes re-
flected the changing era and the changing needs of the Amer-
ican people. 
 Historians of the twentieth century began to study the 
Revolution through the lens of social history—a field which 
would never have entered the minds of more traditional histo-
rians like George Bancroft.  Historian Richard B. Morris 
brought this study succinctly to the attention of the academic 
world in 1977 with his work emphasizing the war as a People’s 
Revolution—a movement primarily propelled forward by the 
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Everyman.  Morris examined the small towns and communi-
ties of the colonies and found evidence of extralegal bodies 
seeking to participate politically before such republicanism 
was widely instituted.  Though the colonies had disparate peo-
ples, they “did unite in a common cause.  What unified the 
discordant elements of the Patriot populace was the conviction 
that only through independence could they build a free soci-
ety.”16  The Revolution was painted as a thoroughly grassroots 
movement, and Morris perhaps considered the strategic deci-
sions made by the Founding Fathers too lightly.  He reflected 
harshly on the historiography of the Revolutionary laity, say-
ing “If we have lost sight of the people who waged the war, it 
is partly the fault of the pompous or trivial portraits of the lead-
ership with which biographers have beguiled us.”17  In his 
many works on the American Revolutionary War, Morris 
sought to uncover what Revolutionary life was like and what 
ideologies and motives pushed the Revolution forward.  This 
interest in plain people and disdain for our founders was a de-
parture from the grand and starkly nationalist histories of the 
Centennial.  Morris, while patriotic, elected not to wax poetic 
about the mythological and divinely-ordained beginnings of 
America and its founders. 
 Expanding historical criticism to include not just pre-
vious historians, but historical actors themselves, Joan Hoff-
Wilson examined the American Revolution with a focus on 
women’s rights.  Unsurprisingly, women were initially allo-
cated very few constitutional rights, and their power in society 
ebbed and flowed as a result. Their most significant charge in 
                                                
16 Richard B. Morris, “‘We the People of the United States’: The 
Bicentennial of a People’s Revolution,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 82, no. 1 (Feb., 1977), 15. 
17 Richard B. Morris, The American Revolution Reconsidered, 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), 14. 
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the Revolutionary era was “the privately virtuous task of rais-
ing patriotic children.”18  Domestic roles gave women a sense 
of private citizenship, but not of public citizenship, a disparity 
which Hoff-Wilson disdained.  In fact, the legal treatment of 
women in this era is deserving of the phrase “constitutional 
neglect.”  At this point in Hoff-Wilson argument, her social 
history research of early American women transformed into 
type of legal research, as she outlined the broader progress of 
American women.19  Her brief history of women in the Revo-
lutionary era was important, particularly because it was a rel-
atively new idea to be considering a group of early American 
figures who were not traditionally powerful or enfranchised, 
but who had to seek legal power later.  Issues of women’s 
rights were more hotly newsworthy during the Bicentennial 
period than the Centennial, so the introduction of these histo-
ries analyzing less popular themes from a national perspective 
logically follows from the social developments of the twenti-
eth century.  Understanding the experiences of the previously 
disenfranchised and overlooked had become more important 
by 1976.  
 Evolving from entertaining Centennial narratives re-
plete with anecdotes and a full cast of characters, constitu-
tional and legal history emerged in the late-twentieth century 
as politicians began to reference the founding legal document 
and the “original intent” of the Founding Fathers.  What was 
the ideology of their republicanism?  Were they conservatives 
or liberals?  The struggle to effectively combine these ideolog-
ical studies with the modes of history characterized much of 
the historiography of the era, and in fact, it continues to be a 
point of contention today.  In the early stages of these efforts, 
                                                
18 Joan Hoff-Wilson, “Women in American Constitutional History 
at the Bicentennial,” The History Teacher, Vol. 22, no. 2 (Feb., 
1989), 147. 
19 Hoff-Wilson, “Women in American Constitutional History,” 
152. 
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Peter S. Onuf, in a study of Bicentennial historiography, com-
mented that “Until recently, however, the founders as political 
actors have been lost to view.  From a structuralist perspective, 
the story of how and why the constitutional reformers created 
a ‘more perfect union’ simply does not seem very important.”  
As increasing Bicentennial scholarship developed, however, it 
became more problematic for constitutional historians that 
“the story of the founding is so difficult to disentangle from 
patriotic mythology.”  Onuf called for a pure narrative free of 
these patriotic undertones—“no narrative is more important 
for the subsequent course of American history than the draft-
ing and ratification of the federal Constitution and the success-
ful inauguration of the new national government.”20  The ana-
lytic emphasis on the political views of the Founding Fathers, 
their exact intentions, and the repercussions of those intentions 
was a popular subject in Bicentennial historiography.  The 
combination of this legal concept of history with the ideas of 
social history produces “a new history of ideas that seeks to 
give meanings to the structures uncovered by social histori-
ans.”21  The addition of constitutional history and ideological 
study to the body of early American scholarship was an im-
portant contribution of Bicentennial historians, as it reflects 
the popular debate of the period regarding our modern under-
standing of the Constitution and of the intentions of its fram-
ers. 
 Jonathan Dull, a prominent diplomatic historian of the 
Bicentennial era, considers American foreign policy with a de-
cidedly critical and realist eye.  He studied the American Rev-
olution from a more Euro-centric perspective than American 
historians of the past, choosing to emphasize primarily the col-
onies’ role in European balance-of-power politics.  His per-
ceived anti-American tones made him controversial to some, 
                                                
20 Peter S Onuf, “Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional His-
toriography in Bicentennial Perspective,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Vol. 46, no. 2 (Apr., 1989), 346. 
21 Ibid., 349. 
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particularly in his claim that “victory in the war for independ-
ence depended on a heavy dose of foreign help and abundant 
good luck.”22  Eschewing the traditional notions of American 
greatness and patriotic destiny, Dull redefined a major Amer-
ican moment of success as merely a theatre of the grander war 
between Great Britain and France.  In evaluating Dull, Law-
rence S. Kaplan found his conclusions rather narrow, identify-
ing his major flaw in “the treatment of the United States, rev-
olutionary diplomacy, and American diplomatic historians.  
The American position is denigrated partly by its absence at 
critical times, partly by pejorative comments.”23  Writing with 
themes clearly contrary to those of Bancroft, Dull reflected a 
transition in thinking that no longer relied on patriotism and 
American nationalism as the sole ideological actor of the Rev-
olutionary era. 
 Kaplan sought to present the American Revolution in 
its broader global context.  Writing to analyze the Bicenten-
nial-era surge of research in this field, he readily introduced 
his article as a product of Bicentennial feeling.  In reviewing a 
deep analysis of the effects of the war on the British Empire 
and King George III, Kaplan challenged “the simplistic Amer-
ican view of the king as a classical villain” and noted that “the 
tone appropriately in a bicentennial theme conveys tolerance, 
some sadness, and an understanding of both sides in 1976 that 
was impossible in 1776.”24  He also encouraged psychological 
analysis of the diplomatic relationships of the period—a revo-
lutionary undertaking.  Perhaps most importantly, he soundly 
debunked the idea of Franco-American good feeling and 
                                                
22 Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolu-
tion (New Haven: Yale University, 1985), 163. 
23 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Diplomacy of the American Revolu-
tion: The Perspective from France,” review of The French Navy 
and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 
1774-1787, by Jonathan R. Dull. Reviews in American History, 
Vol. 4, no. 3 (September, 1976), 389. 
24 Kaplan, “International Perspective,”  412. 
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shared ideals, citing a marked “minimum of sentimentality” in 
recent scholarship devoted to Franco-American relations.  
Having no Bancroftian ideals of brotherhood, Kaplan made 
clear that “France entered the American alliance in pursuit of 
its own interests, and Americans’ detachment from that alli-
ance less than a generation later was equally a product of na-
tional interest.”25  In closing, he also noted the rise of scholar-
ship of the American impact on Russian and Latin American 
bids for liberty as an example of how, in fact, the American 
people were not so different from other people desiring free-
dom and republicanism— the direct opposite of the Centennial 
construction of the uniquely American spirit.   His discus-
sion of how other nations experienced the war enhanced the 
history from one of a uniquely patriotic, American event to 
one of international importance. 
 The Bicentennial historiography of the American 
Revolution was diverse and inclusive of analyses that took a 
more critical view of the period, pointing out failures and suc-
cesses rather than creating a solid narrative of American great-
ness.  After two world wars and with an intensely globalizing 
economy, it is no wonder that this period demonstrated a new 
understanding of the American Revolution in an international, 
diplomatic perspective.  The desire to understand the war and 
independence movement through the lenses of modern trends 
of critical study was a difference between the Centennial and 
Bicentennial— twentieth-century historians promoted a fluc-
tuating and developing idea of history, not a definitive time-
line of unquestionably patriotic events and men. 
 The historiography of the Centennial era demon-
strated a cultural need to shape the American past as a glori-
ous, honorable, and indisputable march of progress; the Bicen-
tennial historiography showed a preference for a history 
complete with the negative and positive, emphasizing interna-
tional themes as well as a discussion of ideological victories 
and failures. Studies of Bancroft, Stillé, and other contributors 
                                                
25 Kaplan, “International Perspective,” 421. 
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to the Revolutionary histories of the late nineteenth century 
showed an unmatched patriotism and desire to protect the 
founders’ reputations.  Centennial historians were undoubt-
edly guided by the desire to heroize the early American years 
and thus create a common sense of admirable ancestry and ide-
ological unity during an otherwise divided period of post-Civil 
War Reconstruction.  Histories rife with notions of a glorious 
nation rising, in its desire for freedom and republican govern-
ment, reinforced the greatness of a single American Union and 
attempted to discourage the divisive rhetoric which had 
abounded during the Civil War.  These works did not, gener-
ally, discuss slavery—which seems at odds with the view of 
Unionist academic liberals, but perhaps this was an attempt to 
avoid the controversy of America’s noble and laudable Found-
ing Fathers owning slaves themselves.  Bicentennial histories 
shied away from some controversies while bringing to light 
others.  In an era tense from the civil rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, Bicentennial histories did not tend to em-
phasize African-American and slave narratives.  This can per-
haps be contributed to the heavy sociopolitical climate of the 
Vietnam War and post-war periods. American pride was low, 
and there was a certain desire to encourage community and 
unity during this period that perhaps made studies of African-
American narratives less popular. Late-twentieth century 
works did, however, discuss the constitution’s initial failure to 
enfranchise women, the ongoing debate of the “original in-
tent” of the Constitution and its amendments, and American 
dependence on foreign powers. In a modern era vastly differ-
ent from that of the Founding Fathers, the Constitution and the 
thoughts of the Founding Fathers were and still are being ex-
amined and theorized upon in an effort to improve the nation. 
 Such diverse interpretations and points of emphasis 
regarding American history may seem daunting or questiona-
ble, especially when they so clearly reflect the environment in 
which they were written, but 
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There would be no point in dismissing works that re-
flect current preoccupations of society.  They are in-
evitable.  They are also frequently useful.  They reveal 
how each generation looks afresh at the past and 
comes up with insights another or earlier generation 
may not have seen or understood.26 
 
Historiography of the American Revolution is a medium 
through which one can see academic trends, societal forces, 
political debates, and ideological developments.  Perhaps the 
Revolution is not as glorious as was once taught, but there is 
still much to be learned about the American character through 
the study of it.  
                                                
26 Kaplan, “International Perspective,”  409. 
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FREEDOM THROUGH MENTAL HEALTH 
IN CRYSTAL WILKINSON’S  
THE BIRDS OF OPULENCE  
 
Lucy Lansing 
 
Mental illness in Appalachia, especially among 
women, is both stigmatized and misunderstood. Deeper exam-
ination of the states of mental health in the region is necessary 
for developing a more complete and accurate portrait of real-
ity. Appalachian women’s stories—especially those concern-
ing mental health status—must be written about and loudly 
proclaimed so that the necessary infrastructure can be erected 
to aid women in their own healing processes. Enabling women 
is not synonymous with speaking for them or constructing so-
lutions for Appalachia based on nonnative conceptions of the 
region; rather, outside resources can help improve states of 
mental health only if implemented on a foundation of accurate 
accounts of real circumstances. As Emily Hauenstein states in 
Archives of Psychiatric Nursing, “invisible women cannot 
speak on their own behalf.”1 It can be dangerous to assume 
that women are inferior or incapable of solving their own prob-
lems. Doing so can breed a toxic culture of submissiveness and 
acceptance of negative circumstances; further, patriarchy ob-
structs frank discussions regarding mental illness among 
women. Opening up dialogues about differing states of mental 
health could create a new kind of culture within Appalachia, 
or at least augment some of its existing aspects. Casting off the 
links of patriarchy and peering into their own psyches, invisi-
ble women could become visible. 
                                                
1 Emily Hauenstein, “No Comfort in the Rural South: Women Liv-
ing Depressed,” in Archives of Psychiatric Nursing (2003), 7. 
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Crystal Wilkinson’s The Birds of Opulence serves as a tool for 
creating such a new atmosphere in Appalachia. The novel, 
written in 2016 and set in a fictional Kentucky town, spans the 
decades adjacent to either side of the early 1960s that are per-
tinent to the multigenerational Goode-Brown family’s lives. 
The Birds of Opulence is littered with characters who battle 
against either their own mental illness or that of loved ones. 
While mental illness is only named by overbearing neighbors 
and fellow churchgoers, it still pervades the universe of Opu-
lence and the lives of the Goode-Brown family. The Goode-
Browns are comprised of a host of female characters strug-
gling to understand sex, mental illness, and their roles in Ap-
palachian society. The matriarch, Minnie Mae, does her best 
to look after her daughter, Tookie, as well as the family prop-
erty. Lucy, Tookie’s daughter, struggles with what might be 
characterized as post-partum depression, among other issues; 
Lucy’s husband, Joe, can fix any broken thing except for his 
wife’s mind. As the daughter of Lucy, Opulence’s resident 
crazy woman, Yolanda seeks solace in her best friend, Mona. 
Relationships between and among the girls and women of Op-
ulence are multifaceted but are largely centered on under-
standing personal histories in the context of mental illness. 
Life in Opulence is based on Wilkinson’s personal and factual 
understanding of Appalachia. Because of the grounding of the 
text in reality, the author illuminates ways in which contem-
porary and future iterations of Appalachia might seek to im-
prove women’s access to and understanding of mental health 
in its various states. Women in Appalachia are not simple crea-
tures, as so many non-regional authors have characterized and 
romanticized them; they are real people who have real tri-
umphs and real struggles. They deserve real mental health 
care. 
The literature pertaining to mental health among 
women in Appalachia is inconclusive but makes clear that cul-
tural values impact regional women’s conceptions of mental 
health. As evident in Wilkinson’s The Birds of Opulence, so-
cial norms can affect how women view themselves based on 
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both personal convictions as well as community standards. In 
Wingless Flights: Appalachian Women in Fiction, Danny Mil-
ler breaks down selections of Appalachian literature in terms 
of gender and mental health;2 Hauenstein, Ida Slusher et al. in 
the Journal of Cultural Diversity, and Henrietta Yurchenco in 
American Music have examined many of the real-life cultural 
implications of Appalachian life that promote mental illness 
stigma.3, 4, 5 For example, Hauenstein writes, “In the rural 
South there is a greater tolerance of aberrant behavior, beliefs 
that illnesses arise from God and must be removed by God, 
and the value of self-reliance.”6 If women exhibit what those 
around them term “aberrant behavior,” their conceivable ill-
nesses might be said to come from God, as is evident in Wil-
kinson’s chapters focused on Lucy Brown. Regional value 
systems have significant impacts on the states of mental health 
in Appalachia, such as emotional repression and isolation; ac-
curate representations of the cultural circumstances in the re-
gion are crucial for developing solutions to these and related 
issues. The integration of critical work on mental health in the 
region with literary interpretations of the phenomenon, such 
as The Birds of Opulence, can prove beneficial for navigating 
the complexities of Appalachian culture’s effects on women’s 
mental health. This paper will illustrate that Appalachian 
                                                
2 Danny Miller, Wingless Flights: Appalachian Women in Fiction 
(Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 
1996). 
3 Emily Hauenstein, “No Comfort in the Rural South: Women Liv-
ing Depressed,” in Archives of Psychiatric Nursing (2003), 7. 
4 Ida Slusher, Cora Withrow-Fletcher, and Mary Hauser-Whitaker, 
“Appalachian Women: Health Beliefs, Self-Care, and Basic Condi-
tioning Factors” in Journal of Cultural Diversity (2010), 84-89. 
5 Henrietta Yurchenco, “Trouble in the Mines: A History in Song 
and Story by Women of Appalachia” in American Music (1991), 
209-224. 
6 Emily Hauenstein, “No Comfort in the Rural South: Women Liv-
ing Depressed,” in Archives of Psychiatric Nursing (2003), 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furman Humanities Review 
 86 
women already possess the cultural abilities to assuage some 
negative implications of mental illness in the region. Examin-
ing Crystal Wilkinson’s novel in conversation with the perti-
nent literature can offer valuable answers for some of the ques-
tions surrounding mental health among women in Appalachia. 
Specifically, in manifesting the daily trials of Appalachian 
women whose lives are tainted by mental illness, Wilkinson’s 
characters serve as experiments in confrontation with some of 
the factors, such as patriarchy, that inhibit efforts to curb the 
negative effects of mental illness. 
Patriarchy is the system of Opulence. Though Crystal 
Wilkinson’s The Birds of Opulence focuses on women, the 
cultural values of the community in which the female charac-
ters live are centered on a male-dominated interpretation of the 
world. The relationship between Yolanda and Mona particu-
larly affirms this point. Both girls, whether or not they do so 
consciously, subscribe to the masculine superiority complex 
of Opulence in ways that damage their self-images and there-
fore their mental health. As one scholar argues, “Appalachian 
history has been constructed out of masculinist narra-
tives…broadening the concept of agency to include women’s 
critique and challenge of power, particularly through hidden 
transcripts of subversion, illuminates the anti-isolationist em-
phases that are revealed in women’s networks.”7 Agency is a 
complicated topic in Wilkinson’s novel because women build 
their levels of personal freedom on a male-oriented founda-
tion. When Obie Simpson sexually assaults Mona, Yolanda’s 
“legs won’t move, but she thinks that if she wills it hard 
enough, Obie Simpson will let Mona go.”8 There is a specifi-
cally male sense of entitlement undergirding Obie’s aggres-
sion that, in addition to the violence and suddenness of the 
                                                
7 Patricia Beaver, “Women in Appalachia and the South: Gender, 
Race, Religion, and Agency” in NWSA Journal (2008): xx. 
8 Crystal Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence. (Lexington: The Uni-
versity Press of Kentucky, 2016): 70. 
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event, likely stalls Yolanda’s response to coming to her 
friend’s aid in a time of danger. The communication of 
women’s realities to a broader community is therefore neces-
sary to stem the pervasiveness of female-female malevolence; 
girls and women, such as Mona and Yolanda, are capable of 
instead pulling each other up to stand on the platform where 
positive mental states exist. The girls were friends once, but 
the bond has been broken by external pressures. Were the 
friendship reestablished, it is plausible that at least the girls’ 
mental suffering caused by rivalry might be mitigated. 
The social rift that gradually develops between 
Yolanda and Mona is the fault of neither of the girls; rather, 
they unintentionally succumb to the patriarchal norms of their 
community. Yolanda shrinks in on herself while Mona ac-
tively and intentionally subverts many of Opulence’s expecta-
tions for women, including how she chooses to dress. The net-
work of women in which they live is anti-isolationist, but 
Mona extends the web of relationships further, eventually ex-
ploring networks outside Opulence; in contrast, Yolanda relies 
on the existing social framework of her home. Competition for 
attention from men is derived from male superiority, not any 
inherent need on the part of the girls to please the male resi-
dents of Opulence. Appealing to the power structure is a natu-
ral response to a socially imposed position of inferiority. 
When such inferiority is exacerbated by the actions of Obie 
Simpson and others, Mona and Yolanda attempt more vehe-
mently to clamber up the social slope toward the pinnacle of 
maleness. Mona is, however, able to temporarily subvert the 
unequal power dynamic even during such an overt display of 
male dominance when “a little, tiny feeling of glee replaces 
her fear and anger” at discovering “this certain kind of weak-
ness she has not known that men and boys have until now.”9 
She experiences, for a moment, the sensation of control. 
Within a patriarchal framework, Mona asserts her cultural 
                                                
9 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 77. 
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power derived from her sex; still, she is like the birds of Opu-
lence, trying to escape from a cage she was born into.  
Social circumstances disrupt the friendship between 
Mona and Yolanda, but the Appalachian emphasis on relation-
ships is present even in difficult times. At Tookie’s funeral, 
Lucy notices Yolanda and Mona clinging to one another; the 
female friendship remains strong, despite years of cultural ten-
sions. It is this tendency of women to cleave to one another in 
times of strife that ensures they are able to withstand the 
stresses of mental illness affecting themselves or loved ones. 
Lucy exhibits this very strength when she gives birth to her 
daughter in the rough environment of a squash patch and again 
when she wrestles with the fact that “mama gone, granny gone, 
roots still here.”10 Lucy seems to cling to who she used to be, 
though she has irreparably changed. Joe notices the shift in his 
wife: “The cooking, cleaning part of her is all he recognizes 
now, all she recognizes of herself. It’s all that’s inside her left 
to give.”11 After Lucy comes home from Eastern State, pre-
sumably a mental institution, she takes up smoking but is still 
affected by something deep within her. Joe’s taking Lucy to 
seek professional help paints him as a symbol for the empathy 
that must exist in communities if mental health is to be suc-
cessfully treated and integrated into holistic health systems.  
Francine Vernon demonstrates how social connec-
tions can be forged and severed depending on how one con-
forms to or diverges from communally established norms per-
taining to mental health. These female- and Appalachia-
specific norms include voluntary integration into social net-
works and participation in communal care of children, among 
others. Through losing loved ones, Francine suffers a degra-
dation of connection with her community. She loses two im-
portant people in her life, and then eventually a third. The first 
is her mother, Helen, who suffers a breakdown, and the second 
                                                
10 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 183. 
11 Ibid.,, 184. 
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is her husband, Sonny; later, her daughter, Mona, leaves Opu-
lence in pursuit of what a city might provide for her. When 
Helen’s mind warps into something unrecognizable, Francine 
splits herself into two versions of Francine—“the lady of the 
house…and another Francine Vernon…curled up into the girl 
she was.”12 The deaths of her mother and her husband cause 
Francine to further retreat within herself, to feel “smothered 
beneath her own skin, smothered beneath all this worry.”13 
Francine’s shift in mental state, whether or not it can or should 
be termed an illness, influences her relationships with her 
community. Soon after she brings her daughter Mona home 
from the hospital, members of the church stop by, seemingly 
to offer support and sustenance. Francine interprets their pres-
ence as nosy and stifling, and “something rolls through her hot 
and quick as thunder.”14 She distances herself from these 
members of the community when she demands that they leave 
her home. The major mental shift—possibly, a break—in 
Francine that comes when her mother changes in personality 
and then dies affects how she chooses to interact (or not) with 
those outside her home. Francine also begins to hoard food, 
evidently in response to negative changes in her life. Perhaps 
it is because she has lost people close to her that Francine 
chooses to abstain from much of the social life of Opulence; 
she may want to avoid forging any relationships that could re-
sult in more personal loss. Whatever the reason for her relative 
isolation, Francine’s tendency to largely keep to herself nega-
tively impacts other women’s views of her. The harmful re-
percussions of this tendency—namely, the disapproval of 
women who might otherwise be in her social circle—are not 
solely due to Francine’s actions. The women around her must 
realize that they have the ability to relieve at least some of the 
internal discord Francine experiences because some of it is 
                                                
12 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 54. 
13 Ibid., 55. 
14 Ibid., 58. 
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wrought by their treatment of her. Casting more light on the 
truths of women’s realities can reveal specifically female abil-
ities to change circumstances affecting mental health. 
Examination of Francine in particular can prove ben-
eficial for understanding female interactions with Appalachian 
value systems. Wilkinson communicates a particularly trou-
bling event in Francine’s history—the rape of this character. 
Francine recalls this disturbing episode in terms of physical 
sensation when an unwitting neighbor tries to soothe with 
what is supposed to be a calming hand; Francine lashes out 
against the women who purport to want to help her.15 She does 
not act in the way the women of Opulence expect that she will. 
The “pathetic mountain women…accepting of their lots in 
life” regarding abuse from men and other hardships, repre-
sented in such Appalachian literature as that by Mary Noailles 
Murfree, can inspire pity in some.16 Francine’s rape and fairly 
solitary life, in some views, might breed pity. She might ap-
pear to fit into the beaten-dog schema derived by those on-
lookers of Appalachia who lack a real understanding of re-
gional culture, but she supersedes the constraints of simple 
categorization. Francine, for all the emotional manipulation 
she has endured, still has the capacity to care deeply for her 
daughter. “Usually quiet and somber as a cow,”17 Francine ve-
hemently protests Mona’s romantic involvement with a mar-
ried man, possibly to protect her from the sort of trauma from 
her own past. “Although the picture of the mountain women 
as hardworking, patient, in many ways subservient, and vic-
tims of the mountain social system is accurate in some re-
spects,” overemphasis of the effect of hardships Appalachian 
                                                
15 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 59. 
 
16  Danny Miller, Wingless Flights: Appalachian Women in Fiction 
(Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 
1996), 36. 
17 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 160. 
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women suffer incorrectly paints these women as weak.18 Fran-
cine, by many standards, might lead a difficult life, but she is 
not defined by what she endures. Though not wholly in ac-
cordance with Opulence cultural norms, her responses to try-
ing events are the result of personal agency and will. Francine 
represents the strong Appalachian women that nonnatives ro-
manticize and misunderstand through their “externally im-
posed structures of domination.”19 This character in particular 
exemplifies the approach that must be taken toward Appala-
chia in general if progress is to be made in the arena of regional 
mental health; assumptions about women in Appalachia must 
be cast aside and the truth examined for community-level re-
sponses to mental illness to be more flexible. 
In grappling with the effects of mental illness, family 
responses can prove critical for affected individuals’ success 
in overcoming otherwise debilitating illnesses. As previously 
discussed, Francine exemplifies one route a life characterized 
by mental illness can take; Lucy also struggles with what 
might be called mental illness, but her proximity to this phe-
nomenon is perhaps more immediate than Francine’s. Lucy is 
arguably the most complicated character in The Birds of Opu-
lence. Much of her understanding of the world is portrayed 
through others’ perceptions of her, rather than through her own 
thoughts and motivations. The community of Opulence widely 
regards Lucy to be crazy. This characterization is pervasive; it 
even affects Joe’s perception of his wife, though “he could 
never have left her side, no matter how crazy she was.”20 Lucy 
denies her child milk,21 drops her on the floor,22 and plays with 
                                                
18  Danny Miller, Wingless Flights: Appalachian Women in Fiction 
(Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 
1996), 37. 
19 Mary Anglin, “Moving Forward: Gender and Globalization in/of 
Appalachian Studies” in Appalachian Journal (2010): 291. 
20 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 27. 
21 Ibid., 25. 
22 Ibid., 32. 
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suffocating her.23 Familial responses to these events differ 
from those of members of the community; Tookie shoulders 
the tasks of caring for both infant Yolanda and distant, adult 
Lucy, matter-of-factly feeding the child and cleaning human 
milk and blood from Lucy’s skin when Lucy is seemingly un-
able to do so. When people aggregate in such large groups as 
the population of Opulence, individual mindsets can be 
blurred by the overwhelming nature of a dynamic conversa-
tion. Bunches of women viewing Lucy through a communal 
lens chastise her for being an incompetent mother, while 
Lucy’s individual family members cast a more compassionate 
eye on her mental state. Even when she “feels hollow, a 
drained riverbed” after Yolanda is born,24 Lucy is still engaged 
enough with her surroundings to feel a deep love for Joe 
Brown. Especially because of her struggle against the confines 
of her mental state, she should be understood in terms of her 
abilities to seek freedom from mental illness rather than by 
what binds her. Family responses to mental illness, in contrast 
with the constricting community response from many of the 
women of Opulence, help Lucy as she tries to free herself from 
the depression she never asked for. 
The motif of the bird, emblematic of freedom, is inte-
gral to The Birds of Opulence. Evident in the novel’s title and 
throughout the book, birds communicate the flights under-
taken by Wilkinson’s various characters. Lucy is shackled by 
what some purport to be mental illness; Mona seeks the free-
dom that might lie beyond the fields of Opulence as a “bird in 
the darkness.”25 A bird motif strings together seemingly dis-
parate narratives of women who are linked by blood and his-
tory. As Tookie relates, “birds were always a sure sign” of 
                                                
23 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 34. 
24 Ibid., 19. 
25 Ibid., 179. 
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some important emotional encounter;26 several chapters in-
clude the names of birds, and female characters are often lik-
ened to the flying creatures. The concept of freedom, inherent 
in birds’ flight, is embodied by the bird-like characters looking 
skyward for escape and answers. Several characters’ (espe-
cially Lucy’s) wings seem to have been clipped by direct and 
indirect experiences with what might possibly be categorized 
as mental illness. Though the image of birds with clipped 
wings might engender pity, Wilkinson’s characters—and non-
fictional Appalachian women—possess the ability to imple-
ment solutions to problems pertaining to mental health. 
Using their own cultural power, women can derive the 
freedom they seek from the snares of mental illness. Through 
community fluency, familiarity with the social trends of Opu-
lence provides some freedom from the stresses of daily life; 
even in the act of taking her own life, Lucy is still aware of the 
cultural practices in which she has been immersed since birth. 
“When she slices through her wrist, she is reminded of cutting 
through chicken bone and gristle.”27 The memory of cutting 
chicken, perhaps for a meal enjoyed by her family, temporarily 
distracts her from her current emotional and physical pain. 
Still, because Lucy lives in Appalachia, the culture in which 
she has evolved has restricted certain elements of her life, es-
pecially her ability to speak freely about what ails her, a cir-
cumstance that could have led to her suicide. “Cultural, social, 
and economic practices may constrain expressions of self-de-
termination.”28 It is possible that in the face of trouble, Lucy 
feels she has run out of options. Edging out stigma through 
education and awareness might stem some of the issues per-
taining to senses of loneliness that often pervade those groups 
of people suffering from mental illness. It appears that “Rural 
poverty also contributes to Southern women’s invisibility and 
                                                
26 Wilkinson, The Birds of Opulence, 139. 
27 Ibid., 188. 
28 Mary Anglin, “Moving Forward: Gender and Globalization in/of 
Appalachian Studies” in Appalachian Journal (2010): 290. 
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increases their risk for MDD (Major Depressive Disorder).”29 
Even if Lucy were to want to articulate how she feels, “the 
language of nerves or other colloquialisms for depressive 
symptoms may not be associated with MDD by primary care 
providers.”30 Establishment of open dialogue as a trademark 
of Appalachian cultural systems could help to solve some of 
the problems associated with the stifling of the voices of cur-
rently “invisible” women. Such establishment requires com-
plete, accurate understandings of the cultural practices of Ap-
palachia, including native forms of language. 
 Mental health among women in Appalachia needs to 
be examined more deeply in the context of regional cultural 
systems. Such literature as Crystal Wilkinson’s The Birds of 
Opulence can provide insight into the implications of cultural 
norms for women’s perspectives on both their own mental 
states as well as those of their loved ones. Deviance from the 
implicitly agreed-upon cultural standards can result in being 
ostracized, as Wilkinson’s Francine and Lucy demonstrate; at-
tempted compliance with such standards can be injurious to 
mental health if stretching to fit a socially prescribed form is 
taxing or ultimately unattainable. Women in Appalachia have 
the cultural power to solve the very problems associated with 
mental health that can result from culturally induced stressors. 
Accurate portrayals of the mental struggles Appalachian 
women face do not involve external voices speaking on re-
gional realities; rather, they are comprised of the perspectives 
of women intimately familiar with the intersection of cultural 
values and mental health. Wilkinson’s novel provides valuable 
tools for peering into the lives of people navigating daily the 
questions of mental illness. Surmounting the minimization of 
emotions’ importance and other obstacles on the path toward 
greater levels of regional mental health among women might 
be difficult, but it can only be accomplished with the guiding 
                                                
 
29 Hauenstein, “No Comfort,” 6. 
30 Hauenstein, “No Comfort,” 7. 
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principle that Appalachian women can use their own cultural 
power to solve their own problems. 
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